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 By piggybacking on the critiques of the historical discipline provided by Leo 
Tolstoy in his momentous novel, War and Peace, I assert that history may undergo a 
reconstruction.  By ridding the historical discipline of the self-interest that has atrophied 
its ability to make a significant, positive impact on the world, and installing a 
metaphysics devoted to equality, freedom, and universality, I believe that it may be 
revitalized as a profession.  I call for a new history, one built in the Hegelian-Marxist 
tradition, which will lead humanity into a future defined by love and self-sacrifice.  It is a 
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The human as a free agent, unbound by determinism and available for historical 
investigation, is foundational to the generally accepted structure of history currently 
dominant in the West.  The modern historian (in broad terms) asserts that history is 
shaped by individual human actions, is knowable to historians through the construction of 
historical narratives, and is non-teleological. In his tremendous work, War and Peace, 
Leo Tolstoy challenged professional historians and the modern notion of freedom which 
undergirds the modern historical enterprise.  The critique that he delivered in the novel 
covers every inch of the aforementioned ideological ground, from agency, to historical 
narration, to non-determinism.  Tolstoy viewed history as none of those things; it consists 
of natural laws that determine the course of events through time.  Natural laws 
impersonally dictate the course of events, in which humans happen to be involved. 
Humanity, in the meantime, naively believes that its existence possesses that grander 
meaning known as freedom.  Tolstoy accused historians of essentially being false priests, 
proselytizers of a religion that peddles the dishonest narrative of human freedom, when 
Tolstoy knows that the only freedom humanity can attain is freedom from the desire for 
freedom.  And, like so many other such proselytizers, Tolstoy accuses historians of 
selling their narrative of freedom for the sake of their own gain. 
The self-interest of national identity, which Tolstoy exploited to its fullest when 
addressing the historical interpretations of the Napoleonic Wars during his time, is 
certainly prominent in his discourse.  National identity as a form of political partiality has 
featured largely (something modern historians are more likely to admit to now than they 
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might have been then) in historical narratives, at least through the Cold War.  Modern 
historians, and modern academics generally, now understand themselves to be much 
more international, inclusive, and globally minded.  Conferences and organizations for 
the various historical subdisciplines take place on a regular basis, and include PhDs from 
universities the world round.  Modern historians would therefore be either dismissive of, 
or offended by, the critique initially offered by Tolstoy.  The self-interest of nationality 
is, however, only Tolstoy’s starting point, and is used to illustrate a basic problem which 
is the focus of the rest of his polemic: historians write different narratives of past events 
because their finite nature as humans prohibit them from understanding the whole, the 
universal.  And when historians do write different histories, attributing this or that event 
to this or that cause in contradictory ways, examples of which Tolstoy illustrated with a 
polemic concerning the French invasion of Russia at the beginning of the third volume of 
War and Peace, how must such a conflict be mediated?  There can be no mediation 
between narratives under Tolstoy; the histories written thus far have all been false 
reconstructions of the past designed to preserve the self-interested error of freedom.  
Tolstoy characterizes the diversion historians attempt to make from determined history, 
or truth, as error within a determined system, although that description raises the question 
of how error is feasible in a determined system. 
 The most prominent answer to the question of competing narratives, an answer 
which diverges from Tolstoy, rests largely in Isaiah Berlin’s famous essay The Hedgehog 
and the Fox. Massively influential on how Tolstoy’s thoughts concerning history have 
been understood, Berlin would have had us believe that Tolstoy was resigned to the 
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different narratives he disregarded in War and Peace.  According to Berlin, Tolstoy was 
an historical, empirical Skeptic who believed that history could only be found in the 
existence of facts, thus limiting the historical pursuit in its ability to make claims of 
certain truth.  The type of empiricism described by Berlin avoids the elements of 
reconstruction and future action that could be part of the historical discipline, but instead 
places absolute primacy on historical data points, thus negating the potential for the 
construction and use of facts toward an end.  Berlin used the analogy of the hedgehog and 
the fox as a dichotomy to understand artists and thinkers relative to their approach to 
knowledge and metaphysical truth.  He characterized Tolstoy as someone who wished for 
a dominant unifying truth, but who knew too much about the world to honestly think such 
a metaphysical truth could exist (the fox who believed in being a hedgehog).  Such a 
characterization was rather convenient for academics of the time, and provided only a 
partial look at Tolstoy’s thought.  Portraying Tolstoy as favorable to the historian who 
would recognize their own limited perspective without seeking something greater was a 
theistic narrative.   
Berlin’s portrayal of Tolstoy enshrined the particular as valuable and dismissed 
hope of the universal.  It supported the academic system as bourgeois, since affirming the 
particular is also to affirm self-interest.  The particular is that which can be identified as 
separate.  The particular resides within the universal as a single point.  The particular may 
be described, as it allows for comparison and disparity.  Because it can only exist 
alongside comparison and disparity, the particular assumes the existence of opposition 
and conflict.  The universal is that which is; it is comprehensive, all-encompassing, 
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without an opposition.  The human is particular, its history is particular, and its 
expression thus far in its existence has all been particular.  Tolstoy recognizes the 
universal through natural law, but places humans as subservient to those laws because of 
our particularity.  We are self-interested, express desire, and take action for those desires 
and thus cause violence and conflict because our particularity restricts us from the 
universal.  Berlin’s approach to the particular-universal dichotomy, or perhaps tension as 
described by Tolstoy, lacks nuance, but the empiricism and pluralism he espouses are 
part of the particular.  Whereas Tolstoy requests us to recognize the universal and submit 
ourselves to it, Berlin rejects the universal in favor of a floating realm of particularities. 
Regardless of his prominence, Isaiah Berlin is not the only scholar who avoided 
the determinist argument in War and Peace, nor is he the only scholar to avoid the 
tension between the particular and the universal that Tolstoy portrays.  Other historians 
and philosophers largely ignored the historical-philosophical stance offered by Tolstoy 
for the better part of a century.  Even the most prominent Tolstoy scholar during that 
time, Boris Eikhenbaum, gave no evaluation to the argument itself, only placed it in the 
historical context of Tolstoy’s life.  Historians generally have not engaged with the 
polemic in War and Peace, the rare exceptions mostly consisting of factual critiques 
given by military historians regarding Tolstoy’s account of battles during the French 
invasion of Russia.  After Berlin’s work, most scholars followed in the path he set out, 
including Gary Saul Morson, Hugh McLean, and Lina Steiner.  In their works, Tolstoy is 
presented as pluralist and a Skeptic.  In the last two decades, however, Jeff Love, a 
research professor in languages from Clemson University, has pushed an interpretation of 
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Tolstoy with more nuance.  The Tolstoy characterized by Jeff Love retains the 
determinism insisted upon in War and Peace, and Love argues that Tolstoy was not only 
generally deterministic regarding the course of history, but deterministic in a pessimism 
regarding the results of human attempts to understand the universe.  Realizing Tolstoy as 
a pessimist, who would rather humanity submit to the laws of nature in peace instead of 
attempting to overcome higher laws with action, is of great assistance in understanding 
Tolstoy’s view of war, peace, and his polemic against historians.  Historians advocate 
freedom of action by writing narratives which present individuals as agents, who cause 
conflict and violence. 
While historians have not responded directly to Tolstoy’s critique, they have 
explored the problems of the particular and the universal to some degree.  Leopold von 
Ranke and his followers advocated for adherence to historical fact via the empirical 
analysis of historical documents in order to achieve a full knowledge of the past.  While 
not philosophically oriented, the empirical approach was widely adopted as a way to 
achieve knowledge.  R.G. Collingwood, and later thinkers along similar lines, Edward 
Hallett Carr and Hayden White, explored the problem of the particular-universal tension 
in more philosophical ways.  They gave onus for the reconstruction of the past into 
narratives on the particular author, as well as the cultural context in which that historian 
developed.  They characterized the historian as a particular agent creating their own 
history, thus particularizing historical writing itself.  While each historian featured 
nuances of their own, the general theme of an historicization of the historian remained the 
same.  Other historians have sidestepped the thorniness of philosophical discourse and 
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have attempted to methodologically perform history in such a way as to either overcome 
or nullify the tension between the particular and the universal.  Steven Bednarksi offers 
an excellent example in the microhistory A Poisoned Past: The Life and Times of 
Margarida de Portu, a Fourteenth-Century Accused Poisoner.  Bednarski’s book is an 
example of the historian attempting to nullify the particular-universal tension.  The 
microhistory is written with a heavy emphasis on narrative descriptions and settings, and 
takes pains to ensure that the reader is given access to the approach Besnarski uses to 
write his historical narrative.  He assures the reader that he could have used his sources 
differently, analyzed them for different information, and constructed a different narrative 
that could not be said to be any less true than his final draft.  He wants to put his 
viewpoint and particularist perspective as prominently as possible, removing himself 
from any potential claim of universal knowledge.  On the other hand, Yair Mintzker 
presents four different versions of the same historical event in The Many Deaths of Jew 
Süss: The Notorious Trial and Execution of an Eighteenth-Century Court Jew, in order to 
respect the different possible narratives available in the source documents.  He also 
includes a new historical mechanic in the monograph: what he refers to as 
“conversations.”  The conversations are short pieces of dialogue between Mintzker and 
what he writes to be the reader of his work.  He creates the dialogue for the reader from 
the questions, critiques, and comments from reviewers of his book, and writes the 
conversations to include as many perspectives as possible.  He refers to the type of 
history he performs in The Many Deaths of Jew Süss as polyphonic history, which is an 
effort to overcome the particularity of writing history by including multiple voices. 
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While it is important to recognize that historians have attempted to explore and 
confront the question of knowledge in the particular-universal dichotomy, none have 
done so through Tolstoy, nor have they solved the central problem.  Tolstoy, as 
interpreted by Jeff Love, calls us determined because we cannot help but seek universal 
knowledge as finite beings, and will suffer as we learn because we are finite.  Tolstoy’s 
avenue, the route he thinks worthy of pursuit for humanity in order to best live, is to 
submit ourselves to the laws of nature.  Exploration of those laws is permissible and even 
admirable, but attempting to subvert or overcome them can bring nothing but conflict.  
Peace is acceptance of our place in the universe, whereas war is to take action in protest 
of our place under natural law.  In order to attain Tolstoyan peace, self-interest must be 
given up.  We are unable to think and act in accordance with ultimate law if we persist in 
efforts to put the self first; self-interest breeds desire, desire is expression of freedom, 
freedom assumes action, and action will bring conflict and violence.  Thus Tolstoy’s 
positive view of selfless attitudes in War and Peace, above all demonstrated by Platon 
Karataev.  Karataev is Tolstoy’s example of living life well, and serves as Pierre’s role 
model late in the novel.  Pierre observes that Karataev has “no attachments, friendships, 
or love, as Pierre understood them; but he lived lovingly with everything that life brought 
his way, especially other people—not any specific people, but those who were there 
before his eyes.”1  Karataev’s character is a denouncement of the particular as well as of 
ownership, and a championing for self-sacrifice and love.   
                                                          
1 Leo Tolstoy, War and Peace, trans. Richard Pevear and Larissa Volokhonsky, (New York: Random 
House Inc., 2007), 973. 
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Tolstoy’s lesson is not to abandon metaphysical truth for the sake of an 
epistemological limbo, in which we are suspended in an eternal search for new facts.  
Such an empirical principle for a discipline could only serve to encourage the creation of 
new knowledge that is forever overwritten by the next generation of facts, resulting in a 
never-ending parade of non-attempts at knowledge.  Rather, Tolstoy encourages us to 
search for knowledge and understanding that emerges through love and self-sacrifice; he 
desires history written for the sake of universal enlightenment and peace, divorced from 
the self-interest that so often typifies our own work.  But Tolstoy is nevertheless 
pessimistic.  He disbelieves in the possibility of human freedom, which could only be 
accomplished through the overcoming of the particular-universal dichotomy.  His thesis 
is theistic.  It places the universe at a distance from ourselves, and asserts our inability to 
ever fully comprehend it.  He also therefore sentences us to eternal suffering; as finite, 
particular minds, we will never be able to approach the end of our limitation, and every 
reminder will cause us pain.  Some historians, like those mentioned who have already 
explored the philosophical nature of the particular-universal tension, have already arrived 
at some agreement with Tolstoy in that regard.  They view our particularity as final, 
unchangeable, and to overcome it as undesirable in most philosophical circles.  History is 
written for its own sake and in order to maintain the bourgeois status of academia.  In this 
regard, historians are in direct conflict with Tolstoy.  By continuing to write historical 
narratives, historians proliferate some idea of freedom and agency unavailable to most of 
society.  History serves no greater purpose for our species; the chronicles of suffering we 
hold, of which War and Peace is analogous, are recounted without the purpose of 
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bringing our species to a greater state of being.  We neither attempt to push humanity into 
a universal state of being, an effort which Tolstoy opposes, nor do we advocate the 
eradication of the desire for freedom, which Tolstoy tried to do in War and Peace.  We 
instead maintain the status quo, one of inevitable suffering and the illusion of escape 
from that suffering through individual, particular effort. We have transformed our 
discipline from a pursuit of knowledge to one of bourgeois limbo, chaining ourselves to 
suffering, death, and the tyranny of self-interest. 
But there are other potentialities, which I wish to explore in this work.  I grant 
Tolstoy that he identified a serious problem in history writing, that is, self-interest and the 
particular, but dismiss his pessimism.  I see no reason to believe that we are all 
determined to the particular.  I do not think that removing the possibility of our own 
freedom of self-determination as beings is constructive.  Why would we bother to act, to 
imagine, to work, to think, if it were true that those activities could have no impact on the 
world?  Why not give in to base instinct, interact with the world in a purely superficial 
manner, and abandon all hope for any greater possibilities?  That is the inevitable end of 
pessimism: apathy, inactivity, and eventually violence, suffering, and destruction.  We 
will abandon ourselves to a Heideggerian state, one in which there can be no moral 
wrong or right, no goal, and nothing beyond our own contemplation of suffering.  We 
would be forever particular.  Those of the conservative left, who draw greatly from 
Heidegger through thinkers like Foucault, would sentence us to the same.  Foucault does 
not even retain any solution; he protests all attempts at a dominant narrative, even one of 
peace.  The thoughts of Foucault can only lead to a so-called negative norm, in which 
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there can be nothing but critique of narratives vying for hegemonic power in praise of our 
individual and collective ignorance, an essentially non-constructive and pessimistic 
condition.  Tolstoy’s argument does not convince me, much less Foucault’s, whose 
argument ignores even the possibility of peaceful submission to universal powers; if 
Tolstoy wished to convince me that our actions have no impact through will on the 
future, then taking action to persuade me to act in a certain way was a mistake.  But I 
cannot deny that Tolstoy puts his finger on a central problem with the historical 
discipline.  Self-interest, which plagues history as much today as it did 150 years ago, is 
certainly a problem.  The historical discipline is bourgeois, and our narratives reflect that.  
We write for other historians, not the general public.  Our narratives embrace no truth to 
work toward for our species, only the endless cycle of fact discovery, the slow atrophy of 
intellectualism fueled by empiricism rather than effort for a metaphysical end. 
Tolstoy’s solution to these problems is not mine.  Tolstoy would have us embrace 
our particularity, and submit ourselves to the all-governing natural laws of the universe so 
that our course as a species may be characterized by peaceful passivism rather than any 
activity which may prove destructive.  He scorned the historians of his time, the Rankians 
and Hegelians, who in all their German idealist sincerity believed in a determined 
positive end for our species that was manifested in our actions.  He would also scorn the 
historians of today, who just as much as Ranke believe in the raw, discoverable fact, 
despite their loss of attachment to the grand, political narratives of nations and “history as 
it really was,” so beloved to many historians Tolstoy would have read.  But to scorn 
positivity is no constructive act, and I disagree conclusively with Tolstoy in his 
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determined pessimism.  I believe in the possibility for positive ends for our species, that 
we may triumph over our particularity, and change the state of our being.  I thus turn to 
the Hegelian-Marxist tradition, to the radical Enlightenment principles of equality, 
freedom, and attainment of the universal, though I do so with some departure from that 
tradition.  The Hegelian-Marxist tradition posits the possibility for human freedom, for 
peace, for the end of suffering and even death, in this world, without gods, mythos, or an 
afterlife.  It may instead be achieved through our own actions.  This is praiseworthy.  But 
significantly, those traditions often emphasize their own determinism; humanity will be 
the manifestation of Reason in the world through the motions of the World-Spirit, will 
overthrow capitalism and install a global communist community.  Such determinism is 
yet more condemnation for the human, though they are much preferable to the sentences 
of Tolstoy, Heidegger, and Foucault.  I see no need for a determined truth, a truth that 
exists with or without our will for it to be.  I instead assert that our truths are those we 
will them to be, and our future will follow from those truths that we will.  That is my 
departure; I do not believe in the inevitable culmination of Reason through the 
manifestation of the World Spirit, nor do I believe in the linear evolution of human 
civilization into the final state of communism.   
Our state of being will be what we determine it to be.  And the end which is 
worthy of such a possibility, the goal which would solve the problems that Tolstoy 
pointed out, not just within the historical discipline, but within our species, is perfect 
universality.  It is the unification of our species, that which wills as it is, with all that is.  
It is the overcoming of suffering, fear, division, violence, and, ultimately, death; in short, 
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it is to become god.  Our access to perfect universality will be achieved via will; the will 
to be self-defining, the will to choose one’s being, to become without restriction of 
possibility, is universal because it is limitless.  The continued efforts toward mastery of 
the universe, labor combined with focused intention, in order to fulfill our will to 
become, at present manifest in the sciences, is the practical path by which we may 
achieve that universality.  History may serve in the philosophical path toward 
universality, which by necessity will only come through the complete unity of our 
species.  We will first be unified in purpose, then being, and then with all that is.  I 
propose that a reconstructed history would serve excellently to persuade humanity’s 
individual members of the worthiness of universality.  We, as new historians, desire 
peace and the end of suffering; to achieve those ends we must convince others that to be 
individual is to suffer, and that to overcome individuality and suffering toward the 
universal is not the end of the human, but merely a transition to a different state of 
existence for that which wills, one which is better because it fulfills the moral imperative 
to overcome our own violences.  That moral imperative will be satisfied through love, 
love most similar to that exhibited by Christ himself; our love, the love of and for all, is 
manifest in self-sacrifice.  The will to give up our individual selves for the sake of our 
entire species, for all those who will to freely, voluntarily undergo the transformation into 
a single will, to experience self-sacrifice and the end of the individual not unto death, not 
unto oblivion, but unto all others of our species, is love.  It will be the last violence we 
experience as individuals, the violence of transformation into a single entity.  New 
historians may act as the agents for such a change.  
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We are the keepers of humanity’s failures, sorrows, sins, and disasters.  Who else 
could serve better to entreat the other members of humanity to seek a better existence, to 
escape the inevitable suffering and violence we inflict on ourselves and others?  It is true 
that all our narratives are constructed, as Hayden White wrote decades ago, and it is true 
that all our narratives serve our own interests, as Tolstoy mockingly noted time and 
again.  But if we united under a single goal, if we subsumed the interests of our 
individual selves to the interests of our species, and used the chronicle of suffering that is 
human history to encourage humanity to reach for the universal instead of wallowing in 
the particular, we can be part of a greater project to overcome our very being.  If we give 
up bourgeois life, epistemological pessimism, and existential complacency, and instead 
offer ourselves for the services of the species, we could serve as the proselytizers of a 
different kind of religion: the new history of universality.  To introduce the new history, I 
begin by dissecting Tolstoy’s critique of historians in Chapter 1.  I divide his critique into 
three different mockeries: the mockeries of the actor, the narrator, and the narrative.  At 
the end of the chapter, I give a brief evaluation of the critique, essentially deciding what 
of it is worth engaging with in order to restructure history along Marxist lines.  Chapters 
2 and 3 are two different historiographical excursions.  In Chapter 2, I evaluate the way 
Tolstoy’s critique has been received and judged since War and Peace was published, 
broken into two parts, the mistakes of omission and the mistakes of interpretation.  In 
Chapter 3, I give a brief historiographical survey of how historians have thought about 
the historical discipline in light of the particular-universal tension in the first part, 
followed by two examples of historical monographs written with the particular-universal 
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tension in mind in recent years.  In Chapter 4, I argue for the new history, informed and 
constructed by Tolstoy’s polemic as well as the historiographies I cover in Chapter 2 and 
3.  I propose a way outside of both Tolstoyan pessimism and Marxist determinism in 


















TOLSTOY AND HISTORY 
Napoleon and the Mockery of the Actor 
 The first time the narrator of War and Peace directly attacks historians is at the 
beginning of the the third volume, six hundred pages in.  Andrei has already nearly died 
at Austerlitz, Natasha has spurned Andrei for a brief but intense affair with Anatole, and 
Pierre has tried on the Freemason apron.  The bones of the story have been built, and the 
main characters have already undergone life-changing occurrences.  The key historical 
event of the novel, Napoleon’s invasion of Russia, is the focus of the polemic, and 
Tolstoy introduces his topic of interest with considerable contextual argumentation.  
Quite directly, the narrator asks: “What produced this extraordinary event?  What were its 
causes?"2  They proceed to list the set of causes that historians of the time (the 1860s) 
generally set upon, a relatively unimportant list of other events and facts which hardly 
feature in the story at all, such as the theft of the duchy of Oldenburg, vague diplomatic 
errors, etc.  But what relevance, the narrator asks, have such abstract and distant events to 
do with the invasion itself, in which “thousands of men from the other end of Europe 
should kill and ravage the people of Smolensk and Moscow provinces and be killed by 
them?”3  They find that there is no satisfactory answer, and thus begins their direct attack 
on historians.  “For us descendants—who are not historians, who are not carried away by 
                                                          
2 Tolstoy, War and Peace, 603. 
3 Tolstoy, War and Peace, 604. 
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the process of research and therefore can contemplate events with unobscured common 
sense—a countless number of causes present themselves . . . equally correct in 
themselves, and equally false in the incapacity . . . to produce the event that took place.”4 
 The narrator is unimpressed by attempts from historians to explain the invasion.  
According to them, historians go about it all wrong, attempting to attribute causes for 
particular occurrences to other particular notions, whether individuals, actions, or events.  
There can be no particular causes in history.  Instead, there are “billions of causes” 
coinciding, none of them “the exclusive cause of the events, but the event had to take 
place simply because it had to take place.”5  The narrator goes on to clarify exactly what 
they mean by necessary events: “Fatalism in history is inevitable for the explanation of 
senseless phenomena . . . the more we try to explain sensibly these phenomena of history, 
the more senseless and incomprehensible they become for us.”6  Naturally, in such a 
destructive narrative to the great men version of history that still had some popularity in 
the mid-nineteenth century, Napoleon can only feature as a clown, the focus of the 
novel’s direct attack on agency.  The narrator states that in 1812, when deciding whether 
or not he wanted to go to war with Russia, he was deciding nothing, neither his fate nor 
the fates of all those who would be affected during the invasion.  Rather, Napoleon “had 
never been more subject than now to those inevitable laws which forced him . . . to do for 
the common cause, for history, that which had to be accomplished.”7 
                                                          
4 Tolstoy, War and Peace, 604. 
5 Tolstoy, War and Peace, 604-605. 
6 Tolstoy, War and Peace, 605. 
7 Tolstoy, War and Peace, 606. 
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 The mockery of Napoleon in War and Peace is the most severe criticism of a 
single character featured in the novel; when he appears, he serves only to demonstrate his 
own ridiculous egoism and self-absorbed behaviors.  His first scene is just before the 
battle of Austerlitz, a rout of the Russian forces for which Napoleon credits his genius the 
victory.  His first appearance is without dialogue; the narrator only provides a physical 
and emotional description of Napoleon’s state.  He is content with his morning, happy 
that the anniversary of his coronation could align with a battle he predicted to be a 
victory.  He only gives the order for the battle to begin once the early morning sun has 
illuminated the grounds for the coming engagement; to him, it was only possible for the 
thousands of men who were going to die within hours to do so once he was satisfied that 
the aesthetic appeal of the setting was adequate for his desires.  Such drama and self-
obsession is nearly unimaginable in the face of the horror that then took place, during 
which Napoleon himself was not in danger.  He tours the field of battle afterwards, 
surveying the dead and wounded of both sides, and encounters Prince Andrei, who is near 
death and surrounded by other wounded. 
Prince Andrei, heretofore an admirer of Napoleon, had been much the same in his 
desire for glory on the battlefield.  Before the battle began, Andrei was thinking out his 
own battle plans, deciding how he would direct the actions of troops in order to achieve 
victory and bring himself glory.  During the battle, when the Russian line is breaking and 
Andrei sees the standard fall, Andrei sees an opportunity to gain that glory by leading his 
battalion in a charge against the French, barely able to hold up the heavy standard as he 
did so and immediately being struck down.  As Andrei falls, he understands that he is 
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approaching an infinite; whether it is the sacredness of life or death itself, or some 
synthesis of the two, is unclear.  What he sees in the eternal sky could be neither, but is 
only brought about by his nearness to death and intense awareness of life.  Andrei 
remains in contemplation of the infinite sky for hours, still bleeding, after the French 
victory has been secured.  When Napoleon comes upon him, severely wounded and 
barely conscious, Andrei knows that Napoleon is there, and hears Napoleon say the 
words: “There’s a fine death.”8   Napoleon, of course, believes that he is giving Andrei’s 
death meaning with the compliment, as if an egotistical honor from some other mortal 
creature could bestow an immortal element upon a dying man.  Andrei ignores him, 
remaining in contemplation: “He knew that it was Napoleon—his hero—but at that 
moment, Napoleon seemed to him such a small, insignificant man compared with what 
was now happening between his soul and this lofty, infinite sky.”9    
Some of Tolstoy’s most beautiful prose in War and Peace is reserved for Andrei, 
in particular the times when Andrei approaches death.  The implication of reverence for 
the awareness of life and death that Andrei had reached was only disrupted by 
Napoleon’s appearance.  After Napoleon orders Andrei to be taken for first aid and 
Andrei wakes with more consciousness of his situation, Napoleon comes by the hospital 
to pay his fallen enemies more honor.  When he reaches Andrei’s bed and asks after his 
condition, Andrei could not even respond: “all this interest that occupied Napoleon 
seemed so insignificant, his hero himself seemed so petty to him, with his petty vanity 
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and joy in victory, compared with that lofty and just, and kindly sky, which he had seen 
and understood, that he was unable to answer.”10   Napoleon does not comprehend 
Andrei’s lack of response, and simply moves on to other soldiers, eventually leaving on 
his horse happy with the recognition his personage had given to the wounded and 
defeated. 
Napoleon’s self-obsession is also illustrated at the beginning of the French 
invasion of Russia, when his forces cross the Niemen River.  A regiment of Polish 
uhlans, excited by Napoleon’s presence on the bank of the river, receive order to find a 
ford and cross.  The colonel in command of the unit, “stumbling over his words with 
excitement,” is driven to such zealous rapture that he begs for the uhlans to be allowed to 
cross the river without a ford, hoping to demonstrate some prowess and make an 
impression on the Emperor.11  When given permission by an adjutant, the uhlans charge 
into the water to disaster; dozens of men and horses drown, despite the presence of a ford 
a quarter mile away.  But these worshippers are “proud to swim and drown in this river 
before the eyes of the man who sat on a log and was not even looking at what they were 
doing.”12  Napoleon later names the colonel to the Legion of Honor, which was, 
naturally, headed by Napoleon himself.  Aside from encouraging such ridiculous, self-
destructive behaviors from his own officers, it is also remarkable to see how the narrator 
portrays Napoleon’s attitude to such rapturous performances: “For him it was no new 
conviction that his presence at all ends of the world, from Africa to the steppes of 
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Muscovy, struck people in the same way and threw them into the madness of self-
oblivion.”13 
Napoleon possesses unparalleled confidence and self-satisfaction when events 
favor his desires.  The French victory at Austerlitz, his situational superiority over his 
defeated enemies and subordinates, all enabled him to feel as though he was in control.  
As the invasion of Russia progresses, and events cease to manifest themselves as he 
wishes, his sense of control, and thus his confidence as portrayed in the novel, wane.  The 
first time Napoleon begins to sense that his unshakeable certainty in his ability to shape 
the world may be unwarranted is at the Battle of Borodino, the most significant battle of 
the invasion.  The Russian army, under command of Grand Marshal Kutuzov, had 
retreated from Napoleon along the roads to Moscow, and gave battle just before the city.  
Generally considered one of the casualty-heaviest battles in history up to that point, 
Borodino saw tens of thousands of casualties for both French and Russian forces.  The 
Russian army chose to pull back after the action, and after significant debate retreated 
beyond Moscow, giving up that city without giving up the war.   
In the view of the narrator, Borodino was a victory for Russia, or perhaps more 
accurately a defeat for Napoleon.  His army was much reduced and exhausted for 
resources, and fell to looting and disorder shortly after Moscow was taken.  Tolstoy 
provides a view of Napoleon that is far removed from the pomposity and arrogance the 
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emperor felt earlier in the text as Napoleon learns of the numbers of casualties in the 
French forces and their inability to completely overwhelm the Russian position: 
Napoleon was experiencing a painful feeling similar to that which is always 
experienced by a lucky gambler, who madly threw his money about, always won, 
and suddenly, precisely when he has calculated all the chances of the game, feels 
that the more he thinks over his move, the more certain he is to lose.  The troops 
were the same, the generals were the same, there were the same preparations, the 
same disposition, the same proclamation courte et énergique, he himself was the 
same, he knew it, he knew that he was even much more experienced and skillful 
now than he was before, even the enemy was the same as at Austerlitz and 
Friedland; but the terrible swing of the arm fell magically strengthless.14 
Napoleon’s agency was taken from him; his will was not made manifest in the world, his 
enemies did not fall before him despite all his knowledge, skill, and experience.  His 
defeat of the Russian army at Borodino did not gift him Russia’s surrender, and only 
served to weaken his own forces while engendering greater hatred against his cause in the 
Russian people. 
Napoleon firmly believes that Moscow would be formally handed over to him, 
and that peace negotiations (during which he would demonstrate his goodwill and 
civilized principles) would be initiated to end the war he had not even wanted.  The 
narrator lists all the things that Napoleon wishes to accomplish in the city, among them 
designing a speech to the official deputation to receive him into the city and listing the 
ways he intends to name the charitable institutions in Moscow after his mother.  The 
gentlemen of Napoleon’s suite fear to tell their emperor the news; they are aware that the 
city is empty, but are so afraid to place Napoleon in “that dreadful position known to the 
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French as le ridicule” that no one speaks to him.15  He eventually notices that the moment 
for a triumphant speech has passed, has the troops move in to take the city, and after 
officially being informed that Moscow was empty, grumpily retires to an inn in a suburb 
outside the city.  The portrayal of Napoleon is as both an actor (or pretender) and a child.  
He is an actor in that he attempts to engage in a line of action that will have purely 
theatrical results.  His thoughts on why he entered into the war, his carefully prepared 
speech, and his plan to justify peace terms favorable to himself have little to do with 
anything anchored in reality.  He entered the war, wanted to give a magnanimous speech, 
and hoped for favorable peace terms for reasons of self-interest; reliance on principles of 
civilization versus barbarity, the justification he imagined to use when describing his 
actions in the war to the non-existent deputation, is merely an excuse to attain more 
political standing and ascend further in the hierarchy of men.  Thus he is an actor on a 
stage whose moment never comes, completely ignored by the Russian people, who are 
intent on continuing the war.  He is also a child in that he presumes there exists a set of 
circumstances, which he desires, without having any evidence of that state of affairs 
existing.  His expectation is that Moscow will be formally given to him and its 
governance transferred to his control, and that there he will begin peace negotiations with 
Russia.  Neither of those circumstances exists, and the fear of his suite to tell him the 
truth marks him as childish.  Rather than take in stride events as they come to him, he 
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expects events to occur according to his will time and again, and time and again makes 
himself a fool (le ridicule) as the invasion diverges from his vision. 
The Mockery of the Narrator 
 Just as Tolstoy mocks the actor who supposes to have the power to influence the 
outcome of history, so does he mock the historian who supposes to understand the 
reasons for historical events.  There is, of course, a set of wry notations the narrator 
makes concerning the biases of historians, especially concerning why the invasion 
happened, and how events like the Battle of Borodino may be interpreted.  National 
identity inevitably raises its head; the aforementioned set of explanations for the cause of 
the invasion include a laundry list of possibilities convenient for any given perspective.  
Napoleon himself believed the war was started by the “intrigues of England,” and 
conversely to the English by “Napoleon’s love of power.”16  When Moscow burns, blame 
is tossed back and forth by Russians and French, both attempting to demonize the other 
for attempting to destroy an ancient and sacred city out of either the too-fierce patriotism 
of the Russians or the “savagery of the French.”17   
There are also other, more individual biases to consider; the narrator often directs 
their attacks on historians who seek to support the great man interpretation of history, 
who naturally favor Napoleon and his individual agency.  Introducing the Battle of 
Borodino, the narrator calls both Kutuzov and Napoleon fools for accepting battle; it 
                                                          
16 Tolstoy, War and Peace, 604. 
17 Tolstoy, War and Peace, 897. 
24 
 
proved disastrous for both, though more so for the French.  The narrator is more 
sympathetic toward Kutuzov, since Kutuzov represents the ideal of Russian spirit and 
maturity, patient and reluctant to engage aggressively with the enemy.  But both are 
nevertheless moved by the same unintelligible forces that shape all events: “In offering 
and accepting battle at Borodino, Kutuzov and Napoleon acted involuntarily and 
senselessly.  And only later did historians furnish the already accomplished facts with 
ingenious arguments for the foresight and genius of the commanders, who, of all the 
involuntary instruments of world events, were the most enslaved and involuntary 
agents.”18   The narrator completely counters the traditional narrative of historians.  
Kutuzov did not cunningly retreat until a strategic point at which to give a battle he knew 
would result in a Pyrrhic victory for Napoleon, or bumble his way into making a mistake 
by losing a third to a half of his army.  Napoleon did not ingeniously chase Kutuzov with 
the goal of stopping at Moscow to finish the war, or sacrifice the quarter of his army at 
Borodino that he thought necessary to break the spirit of the Russians and finish them off 
in the countryside beyond Moscow.  These arguments are constructions generated by the 
egos and interests of later historians, who are willing to ascribe some kind of genius to 
humans reacting to everything around them, rather than embracing the subservient 
position of humans in the natural order according to Tolstoy’s urging. 
The narrator expounds on the criticism of great men and generals after the Battle 
of Borodino takes place.  They detail specifically how ridiculous it is to assume any 
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commander is in control of the events of war: “The activity of a commander does not 
have the slightest resemblance to the activity we imagine to ourselves, sitting at ease in 
our study . . . a commander in chief always finds himself in the middle of a shifting series 
of events, and in such a way that he is never able at any moment to ponder all the 
meaning of the ongoing event.”19   The commander has, by necessity, an incomplete 
account of the facts as they are coming to them, and constantly hears directly 
contradictory accounts, especially during battle.  The commander‘s lack of knowledge, 
but necessity to act, is reminiscent of both the tragedy of human agency already framed 
by the novel, and analogous for the effort of the empirical historian.  Historical facts 
exist, but their meanings are constantly being transformed and shaped by events 
occurring within the passage of time.  Just as the commander attempts to develop orders 
and strategies to address the facts as they understand them, but is unable to develop 
foolproof strategies, so the historian attempts to write accurate histories without knowing 
all the facts or their complete meanings.  Both are the result of the desire for meaning to 
be derived from human agency.  The commander wants to win the battle and influence 
the future, and in the same way the historian wants to produce a significant work for 
future historians.  The futility of the actor is similar to the futility of the narrator, and both 
emerge from self-interest. 
The futility of Tolstoy’s historical narrator is derived from both their methods and 
their motives.  Methodologically, the historian writes histories based on the existence of 
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empirical facts.  If history is constructed from facts alone, which are understood as single 
units of information that refer to a specific moment in time, and describe or are related to 
historical events and persons, then the fault of empirical historians is twofold.  First, in a 
practical sense, there exists the problem of limited perspective and information.  
Archives, the storehouse for the materials of the historian, are inevitably incomplete; 
documents and evidences are lost or destroyed, or nonexistent about a relevant historical 
event in the first place.  The result is a loop of disciplinary effort: the historian goes to the 
archive, uncovers a heretofore unknown fact about an historical event or figure (although 
still lacking a complete knowledge of their subject), and writes a new history about that 
event or figure incorporating the new fact.  Often, of course, this is not the case.  The new 
fact can’t be found, so the historian will work to reinterpret the old facts, which are still 
limited, and assigns themselves/is assigned to a school of thought concerning their 
particular method or viewpoint.  The historian will thusly be regarded as having still 
accomplished the goal of history by using facts to substantiate a new narrative.  
Throughout this process, no one who is taken seriously suggests finding a way to reach a 
true, final conclusion about anything historical.  There is the general presupposition that 
there are multiple truths, with differing validity based on the amount of used facts and 
political popularity, a conclusion inimical to Tolstoy’s determinist conviction.  In an 
empirical system, anything less than multiple truths supported by facts is a single truth, 
which is either religion or childish nonsense, and anything more than truths beyond just 
individual facts is postmodern relativism, lacking in both logical coherence and moral 
soundness.  But the remaining procedure is an infinite loop of gradually deteriorating 
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authority.  The historical discipline utilizing the empirical method lacks an end and 
creates the conditions for the rise of bureaucratic careerism.  Without a universal truth to 
provide the guiding light for the efforts of historians, self-interest and the desire for a 
closed off community develop within the discipline.  Historians become concerned with 
questions relevant only to other historians, write most chiefly for other historians, and 
focus ever more on niche historical events in and of themselves, without attempting to 
discover certain truths.  Historians, writes Tolstoy in the epilogue of War and Peace, 
“without answering the essential questions of mankind, for some sort of purposes of their 
own, serve as current money for the universities and the mass of readers—lovers of 
serious books, as they put it.”20 
The second problem that Tolstoy raises for empirical historians is with regards to 
the nature of the fact being opposed to the nature of the human species.  The fact, at least 
nominally, refers to a single point in history.  It describes a finite extant thing or set of 
things, and is supposed to exist alongside other facts so that historians can attempt to 
reconstruct them to understand the past.  But, the narrator asks, how useful is such a 
thing?  Is it even compatible with the rest of our knowledge of how things work?  Their 
conclusion is that the fact is similar to the unit of space described in Zeno’s paradox of 
Achilles and the tortoise.  According to the Ancient Greek philosopher, if Achilles and 
the tortoise begin walking while the tortoise is ahead and both are continuously moving, 
even though Achilles is far faster, Achilles can never catch the tortoise.  As Achilles 
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covers half the distance, the tortoise will add more distance, and so on forever; Achilles 
cannot cover the apparently infinite distance that the tortoise will inevitably keep 
generating as it moves.  This paradox was meant to explain that motion and change are 
illusory; Zeno’s belief was that the universe is static.  Similarly, if the historian is 
consumed with the apparent infinite variety of individual facts as units, it will seem as 
though historical truth is illusory.  After roughly two millennia of development in 
mathematics, calculus was invented by independently by both Isaac Newton and 
Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz in the mid-17th century.  The purpose of calculus, as the 
narrator delights in at the beginning of the third part of the third volume in War and 
Peace, is to mathematically describe motion, thus enabling mathematicians to refute 
Zeno’s paradox. 
History, according to the narrator, can be thought of in the same way.  Facts can 
analogously be thought of as units of motion, as in calculus.  But the investigation of 
calculus is not the particularities of individual units of motion, but rather the laws and 
governing principles which hold sway over motion itself.  The presumption behind such 
universal laws is that all the instances of motion are connected.  The narrator assumes 
that the movements of history function similarly: “The movement of mankind, 
proceeding from a countless number of human wills, occurs continuously.  To 
comprehend the laws of this movement is the goal of history.  But in order to 
comprehend the laws of the continuous movement of the sum of all individual will, 
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human reason allows for arbitrary, discrete units.”21  The efforts of modern historians, 
according to the narrator, have focused too much on individual instances in history rather 
than attempting to make sense of the whole of history at once.  This error is due to an 
imagined separation between the existences of historical facts: “but however small the 
units that history takes, we feel that allowing for a unit that is separate from another, 
allowing for the beginning of some phenomenon, and allowing for the notion that all 
individual wills are expressed in the actions of one historical person, is false in itself.”22  
The narrator thus urges historians to understand history mathematically rather than with 
the isolation of individuals in mind. 
The preservation of individual analysis in historical methodology, rather than 
turning to a universal mathematics, implies a motivation for writing history which 
presupposes a desire for a history that assumes the freedom and influence of the 
individual agent.  Assuming, as the narrator does, that history is determined, bound to 
natural laws outside human influence, then all human action is devoid of meaning.  There 
can exist no great men to shape the world for future generations and who live forever in 
the glory of collective memory.  There can be no historical accounts or analyses to 
change the way a historical topic is understood.  All the efforts of historians to engage in 
empirical study and “fix” the histories that were previously written are childish assertions 
of an agency that does not exist.  All these efforts are, for Tolstoy’s narrator, mere errors 
in the course of what nature has set out for our species.  Action cannot lead where natural 
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law will take us anyway, and it certainly cannot take us outside the parameters of those 
laws, if we are indeed ruled by them.  Thus the evaluation of historians Tolstoy directly 
illustrates in Part II of the epilogue, dropping the voice of the narrator, concerning how 
historians engage in their discipline.  It is worth reading again with greater context.  He 
defines historians who study the movements of people over time, or historians interested 
in political narratives and cultural changes, thusly: 
General historians and historians of culture are like people who, having 
recognized the inconvenience of paper money, decide instead to make coins out 
of a metal that lacks the density of gold.  And the money will indeed come out 
having the clink of coin, but only the clink.  Paper money might still deceive the 
unknowing, whereas a coin that clinks but has no value will deceive no one.  As 
gold is only gold when it can be used not for exchange alone, but also for real 
things, so, too, general historians will only be gold when they are able to answer 
the essential question of history: what is power . . . And as tokens that resemble 
gold can only be used among a group of people who agree to take them for gold, 
and among those who do not know the properties of gold, so, too, general 
historians and historians of culture, without answering the essential questions of 
mankind, for some purposes of their own, serve as current money for the 
universities and the mass of readers—lovers of serious books, as they put it.23 
The currency-based analogy Tolstoy uses to describe the motivations of historians 
reflects his sense of the self-interest that energizes the historical discipline.  He is quite 
dismissive of historians and their serious books that ask all the wrong questions, and sees 
little to be gained from histories that focus on only a few people.  The interest of such 
histories is to suppose that the source of power in history to cause events cannot be but 
vested in individuals, and thus constitutes a discipline-wide error. 
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To err from the natural course of history is always an act of selfishness.  To 
enfold one’s self into the ultimate purpose of natural law and end childish self-assertion 
would be to take Tolstoy’s words to heart.  To laud the individual and assert their power 
to have influence on events; what could there be more self-interested?  It is a political 
endeavor, an endeavor to escape natural law for the sake of one’s own self.  Histories of 
those deemed interesting, influential, important, who had meaning in their lives worth 
learning from after their death; these are all manifestations of the desire for agency in a 
world empty of freedom.  Historians sense their inner desires to assert themselves on the 
world, recognize that others feel the same way, and write histories satisfying to those 
desires.  To Tolstoy, what could such a historical discipline be but a group of self-
aggrandizers, advertising freedom in their so-called “serious books?”  They develop a 
vocabulary exclusive to their community and create a body of works that is substantially 
difficult for the rest of society to access because of paywalls and membership restrictions.  
They have control over what gets published as history through community self-regulation 
and disciplinary politics, and choose their own successors by having significant control 
over the education of future historians.  Tolstoy’s antipathy towards the early form of the 
modern historical discipline developing during his lifetime is unobscured in War and 
Peace; in the analogy from the epilogue he bluntly calls historians forgers and liars, 
effective enough only to trick the ignorant. 
The historian may be forgiven for asking how Tolstoy justifies the polemic he 
delivers in War and Peace.  Tolstoy’s criticism focuses on the elements of self-interest he 
finds influential in history.  However, a perceptive reader might point out that Tolstoy’s 
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polemic itself is an act of self-assertion.  The very act of writing, one may argue, is a 
form of self-assertion, or worse, according to Tolstoy’s supposed adherence to natural 
law, a form of self-preservation in opposition to natural law.  For what desire would he 
take the trouble to write a novel over a thousand pages long, have it published and 
distributed, and have the gall to criticize someone else doing the same thing, if not the 
desire to be read?  Tolstoy still asserts his own voice and views, and if he hopes to be 
read after his own death, or to have his published works feature as some sort of memorial 
after his death, then the historian may be justified in calling him a hypocrite.  Platon 
Karataev, Tolstoy’s own paragon of selflessness, would hardly write and publish works 
espousing a determined truth.  Such an act would have no meaning for someone who 
“often said something completely opposite to what he had said before.”24  Another 
problem that appears when considering the contradictions of Tolstoy’s work is part of his 
own view of the natural course of history.  If, as he says over and over, history really is 
bound to turn out in one particular way, and we have no freedom, then exactly what does 
he suppose to accomplish by writing a polemic about those who supposedly err in 
attempting to understand history?  If history will be what it will be and events can only 
come true in a single way, then why would he attempt to persuade anyone of that truth?  
His attempt would garner exactly zero results; persuasion itself is part of the illusion of 
freedom.  We can only act as nature has determined we will act.  Even if everyone in the 
world read War and Peace and were convinced to give up their own self-interest, it 
would not be because of Tolstoy’s work.  It would occur because it would be the course 
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of natural law.  The line of reasoning that reveals this contradiction in his effort also 
illuminates another contradiction: how can anyone err in a determined history?  If history 
will be what it will be, then the historians he disparages are still serving to that end, and 
his polemic serves no purpose other than to feature in the same history alongside all the 
works he condemns as useless. 
The Mockery of Historical Narrative 
The contradictions of Tolstoy’s effort weaken his argument about determinism.  
Nevertheless, exactly why he turns to determinism, and how he utilizes natural law to 
mock historical narrative, are still worth considering.  In the book, the narrator uses 
mathematics as their starting point, enamored as they seem to be with Newton and 
Leibniz.  In the same section the narrator describes the problem with the current historical 
profession in the third volume, the narrator likens historical reasoning to scientific 
observation of the world: 
Peasants say that a cold wind blows in late spring because the leaf buds of the oak 
are sprouting, and indeed a cold wind blows every spring when the oak is 
sprouting.  But though the cause of the cold wind that blows as the oak sprouts is 
unknown to me, I cannot agree with the peasants about the sprouting of the oak 
being the cause of the cold wind, if only because the force of the wind is beyond 
the influence of the leaf buds.  I only see the coincidence of conditions that occurs 
in every phenomenon of life, and I see that however long and thoroughly I 
observe the hand of my watch, the valve and wheels of the locomotive, and the 
leaf buds, I will not learn the cause of the bells ringing, the movement of the train, 
and the spring wind.  For that I must change my point of observation completely, 
and study the laws of the movement of steam, bells, and the wind.  Historical 
science must do the same.25 
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The narrator draws the conclusion that if history can be understood mathematically, 
wherein the movements of humanity may be better analyzed through a calculus-like set 
of formulations which cover the species as a whole rather than considering it to be broken 
up between individual factors, then those same formulas must hold true throughout time.  
Natural laws (especially in the times of Tolstoy, in which quantum physics and relativity 
were yet to be discovered) are consistent across time and are reducible to mathematical 
operations.  Those basic natural laws, and the hypothetical mathematical formulations 
used to describe them, have therefore already determined the course of history into the 
future.  The narrator is not so optimistic as to say that we may actually predict the future, 
but does affirm mathematical analysis of human history in its whole: “No one can tell to 
what extent it is given to man to achieve in this way an understanding of the laws of 
history; but it is obvious that the possibility of grasping historical laws lies only on this 
path.”26 
 The narrator is thus justified in their attack on the freedom of the characters in the 
story by appealing to mathematical, unchanging natural laws.  Under the premises given 
by the narrator, the conclusion that reveals itself is one that rejects historical narrative.  
There can only be, according to the narrator, a single path for history to take, which 
humans have thus far made little progress in discovering.  Historical accounts have, it 
seems to the narrator, been little more than stories about important men who supposedly 
did important things.  But since agency has already been dismissed as foolishness, 
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historical narratives are not works that recount history itself, but are rather self-serving 
stories created by historians.  The narrator is quite clear to refer to the historical 
discipline, as outlined in the aforementioned section on mathematical history, as a 
science.  The narrator presumes the historical discipline is not about stories, but about the 
discovery of indisputable laws that shape its progress.  Umbrage is indeed taken with the 
deployment of narrative to recount history.  Young Nikolai Rostov serves as an excellent 
character to make the point. 
 As a young man at the beginning of the novel, Rostov enlists in the Russian army 
as a Hussar, and dreams of glory for himself, his family, his country, and his emperor.  
Early in the wars against Napoleon’s France, before the disaster at Austerlitz, Rostov 
engages with the enemy on the battlefield.  During his first skirmish, when he charges a 
French unit alongside other Hussars, he experiences the confusion of battle and is 
wounded.  His confusion and agitation in the midst of his first battle is so intense that he 
doesn’t even remember how he is wounded during the charge.  One moment he is 
charging on his horse, the next:  
“‘What is it?  I’m not moving ahead?  I’ve fallen, I’ve been killed . . .’ Rostov 
asked and answered in the same instant.  He was alone now in the middle of the 
field.  Instead of moving horses and hussar backs, he saw the immobile earth and 
stubble around him.  There was warm blood under him. ‘No, I’m wounded and 
my horse has been killed . . .’ Where ours were, where the French were—he did 
not know.”27 
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The desperation he feels, the lack of awareness he has of his own predicament, are 
brutally communicated.  There is no mitigation of his fear as he struggles to identify 
where his enemies and allies are, the results of the skirmish.  He realizes that the French 
are continuing to advance: “He looked at the approaching Frenchmen and, though a 
moment before he had been galloping only in order to meet these Frenchmen and cut 
them to pieces, their closeness now seemed so terrible to him that he could not believe his 
eyes.”28  He is even unable to process how they could be coming to kill him, his childish 
perspective still apparent through his own thoughts: “‘Can it be they’re running to me?  
Can it be?  And why?  To kill me?  Me, whom everybody loves so?’  He remembered his 
mother’s love for him, his family’s, his friends,’ and the enemy’s intention to kill him 
seemed impossible.”29  Rostov is pitiful, a child who has no place in the senselessness of 
war.  His fear, his flight, are painful.  There is no honor in the actions of him or those 
chasing him.  There is only an abject fear of death with which Rostov had previously 
been unacquainted.  The narrator is thorough in taking advantage of Rostov’s 
childishness as Rostov flees the field to the Russian line: “Quickly leaping over the 
hedges, with that swiftness with which he had run playing tag, he flew across the field, 
turning his pale, kind young face back from time to time, and a chill of terror ran down 
his spine.”30 
 The Rostov that later appears when he recounts the tale of his first skirmish and 
injury (a dislocated arm) is quite different. When he, his future brother-in-law Berg, and 
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social climber Boris Drubetskoy meet by chance and Boris presses him to tell the story, 
the event that Rostov describes is far distant from the daze of fear and confusion he 
actually experienced.  Rostov gives them a story he feels is expected, in which he 
certainly did not fall off his horse, dislocate an arm, and run back on foot.  He gives them 
a story “of how he got all fired up, forgetting himself, how he flew like a storm at the 
square,” cutting down Frenchman with his saber left and right.31  Here the narrator is 
surprisingly gentle in their mockery.  They assert Rostov’s attempt at genuineness: 
“Rostov was a truthful young man, not for anything would he have deliberately told an 
untruth.”32  Instead, the problem necessitating a factually inaccurate retelling rests with 
his listeners: “If he had told the truth to these listeners, who . . . had formed for 
themselves a definite notion of what an attack was, and were expecting exactly the same 
sort of account—they either would not have believed him, or worse still, would have 
thought it was Rostov’s own fault that what usually happens in stories of cavalry attacks 
had not happened with him.”33  Narrative exists in Rostov’s account, certainly, and it 
does rely on facts.  But the narrative is, by necessity of the context of its recounting, a 
self-interested one.  Because Rostov maintains himself as the prime beneficiary of the 
retelling, his narrative becomes distorted to his benefit.  Most obviously he wants to come 
off as having conducted himself bravely during the attack.  But equally important is his 
consideration of how his peers will view his honesty.  They would suspect him of lying 
                                                          
31 Tolstoy, War and Peace, 242. 
32 Tolstoy, War and Peace, 242. 
33 Tolstoy, War and Peace, 242. 
38 
 
or error if the narrative turned out in a way they did not expect, or at least he fears that 
possibility. 
 The narrator also offers another reason that Rostov’s story turns out differently 
from his experience: “in order to tell everything as it had been, one would have to make 
an effort with oneself so as to tell only what had been.”34  For events to be retold with 
exactitude, no evaluation can occur.  Nothing may be given to the events which would 
constitute a greater meaning.  Events could only ever be described as what they are if 
they are to be considered true to their unfolding.  Rostov would have had to tell the story 
of his first skirmish without consideration of his self-image or the views of his peers.  But 
narrative always gives values.  Narrative is constructed from a particular perspective or 
set of particular perspectives, and particular perspectives can only ever be evaluative.  
The viewpoint of the particular is to see oppositions and understand the world as broken 
apart into distinct aspects to be considered separately.  In Rostov’s case, he could not 
help but first see the French as targets, then terrifying, battle as first exhilarating, then 
confusing and frightful.  He can not help but see the judgments of his peers and how 
telling his story may impact himself.  Rostov is aware of himself as distinct from the rest 
of the world, and he tells his story accordingly.  The truth of the world, the natural laws 
which determine how events will continue to unfold into the future, cannot be described 
from a single perspective, and therefore cannot be described with narrative. 
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 Tolstoy seems to see no substantive ways in which historians and their narratives 
are different from Rostov and his.  Historians retell events in the past from their 
perspective according to their own self-interest and the expectations of their peers.  
Historians inevitably have self-interested goals, as the narrator never seems to cease 
pointing out, although in the current day less political weight is given to the cause of the 
Napoleonic wars.  The narratives given then about the worthiness of the wars, who 
started them, if Napoleon or the Russian generals were military geniuses, all had political 
contexts.  Even aside from a broader political value, the narratives given by historians 
still serve in the politics of the university and academia.  Historians so often live to “serve 
as current money for the universities and the mass of readers—lovers of serious books, as 
they put it,” to once again quote that biting description.  Put in Marxist terms, we pursue 
a bourgeois life of contentment by producing narratives that keep us in university jobs 
and satisfy the current culture of academia.  There is no attempt to pursue a truth, a 
unifying element that may bring our species together under the natural law that Tolstoy 
holds up high.  The narratives given by historians are therefore shallow for Tolstoy.  If 
anything, Rostov has a greater claim to the value of his narrative.  He at least experienced 
the event he retells, and invested the safety of his being to be able to retell it.  This may 
explain why the narrator’s mockery of Rostov feels so gentle in comparison to the bed of 
coals they rake historians over.   
Evaluation of the Polemic 
Tolstoy critiques the historical discipline as primarily motivated by self-interest, 
which promotes the pursuit of bourgeois comfort, political maneuvering, and conflict.  
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His conclusion that the universe is determined negates the historical actor because 
individuals cannot act against natural law.  Similarly, the narrator and narrative are 
condemned because they concern themselves with the particular rather than the universal.  
The stories of individuals are prioritized rather than the forces which manipulate all.  The 
question that remains is whether the polemic offered in War and Peace is completely 
devalued by its internal contradictions.  There are three significant problems: Tolstoy’s 
personal hypocrisy of self-interest in writing the work at all; the contradiction of 
attempting to persuade anyone in a determined world; and the contradiction of how 
anyone could act incorrectly, or err, in a determined world.   
The first is far less significant than the others.  Despite what may be justly 
perceived as hypocritical about it, Tolstoy’s work still provides an argument worth 
considering.  Any argument must be considered on its own, regardless of its origin.  
Therefore, we historians must ask ourselves if we produce our narratives out of self-
interest and political pursuits, a question due further consideration later in this work.  So 
the first contradiction may be dismissed as immaterial.  The other two contradictions are 
far more serious, and have significant impact on the coherence of Tolstoy’s argument.  If 
Tolstoy seeks to persuade his readers that there is a problem with the historical discipline, 
he must consider it possible for his readers to change their minds, thus enacting change in 
the world, as a result of his persuasion.  As he points out numerous times in the text, the 
idea that any event in the world happens due to the actions of humans rather than 
deterministic natural laws is entirely mistaken.  He contradicts one of the pillars of his 
argument by writing an argument at all.  Thus, the whole premise of persuasion is 
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dismissible.  In the same sense, the foundational point of the polemic against historians, 
that they’re doing history incorrectly, lacks any coherence.  How could they have been 
doing anything wrong if they were determined to do so by natural law?  Such a premise 
becomes silly given some thought.  If Tolstoy had been logically thorough about history 
as deterministic, then historians would be fulfilling natural law whether they know it or 
not.  The common ground for each contradiction is determinist history.   
To take the polemic into consideration assumes that we as historians may seek an 
understanding of it and attempt to create change within our discipline based on it if we 
find it compelling.  To do so presumes the existence of agency on our behalf.  Therefore, 
a serious reading of the text must consider the premise of determinism to be unnecessary.  
By disregarding determinism, we are free to take the text seriously and consider change 
to our discipline without the contradictions which hold back Tolstoy’s polemic.  This is 
all well and good, but the next step is to consider whether or not the polemic needs 
determinism as a premise to function as a worthwhile critique.  The polemic in War and 
Peace attacks the notions of agency, the narrator, and narrative.  The agent is ridiculous 
because they presume to influence future events, even though they are determined.  The 
narrator (or historian) is ridiculous because they purport to explain a universal set of 
occurrences with particular explanations based on self-interest and particular facts.  The 
narrative is a dysfunctional form of historical recounting because it is also particular 
rather than universal.  Without determinism, it is obvious that the attack on the agent 
lacks the same convincing power.  While it may be true that individuals have less 
influence on the outcome of events than they often think, to say there is no agency at all 
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is too strong a statement to make without the presumption of determinism.  The attacks 
on the narrator and the narrative, however, are based on more than determinism. 
A distinct aspect of the natural laws Tolstoy presumes guide the course of the 
universe is their universalism.  They are all-encompassing.  Nothing can escape their 
purview, thus his ability to rely on them to condemn the actor who claims to influence the 
future.  He also relies on them to condemn the particular, because to prioritize the 
particular is to assume an exception to the rule, something that may be considered special 
or more important than other particulars.  To prioritize the particular inevitably ends in 
evaluation and comparison.  To prioritize a particular is to engage in self-interest.  War 
and Peace does few things more frequently than condemn self-interest, especially among 
the aristocracy, of which Tolstoy was a part, much to his loathing.  The parlor-room 
social gatherings devoid of substance, the immense amounts of wealth amassed by the 
aristocracy at the expense of the peasantry, Napoleon’s drive to conquer Europe—all 
created by the error of self-interest.  In Tolstoy’s depiction, self-interest is cancerous and 
violent.  Even well-intentioned assertions of self, as Pierre’s efforts seem in the epilogue 
when he discusses governmental reform, inevitably lead to violence.  It appears Pierre 
was attempting to convince his family and friends to side with the Decembrists, who in 
1825 engaged in what is often considered a leftist revolt against the tsar.  The revolt 
failed, and its leaders were executed.  The reason Tolstoy depicts battle so harshly and 
realistically, and mourns his characters as they die from violence, is because of the 
disdain for violence that permeates the novel.  At the core of Tolstoy’s polemic is an urge 
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towards peace, one that asks us to put aside the particular so that we may consider 
ourselves as an entity altogether, as a single whole. 
Even if Tolstoy’s logical appeal to determinism to support a notion of peace is 
weak, it is still in order for us to ask ourselves if we as historians prize self-interest and 
the particular rather than the universal, so that we may fully explore the polemic given by 
Tolstoy.  Do we function as little more than university currency?  Are we motivated to 
bring our species to a better state of existence, or to make enough money so we don’t 
have to worry about bills?  Do we write history for the elucidation of all, or to appeal to 
readers of serious books?  Do we invite conflict rather than work to create a worthy 
consensus?  Depending on the audience and the conclusion, the question may also then 
be asked: Is it true that to prioritize the universal is good?  Suppose we do prioritize the 
particular and our self-interest over the universal, as Tolstoy would lead us to believe.  Is 
that wrong, and if so, why? 
 









THE RESPONSE TO TOLSTOY 
As befits an artist with the cultural impact and esteem of Leo Tolstoy, a number 
of publications have been written in response to his style and thoughts.  In North 
America, there is an entire journal dedicated to him, the Tolstoy Studies Journal, which 
has been releasing publications since 1988.  Articles about Tolstoy have been published 
in numerous other periodicals besides the eponymous one, and there have been countless 
books written about his work.  As the best known of his works, War and Peace claims no 
small share of that publication pie.  When War and Peace was first published, and for 
some time after, the polemic against history that Tolstoy delivered was, if not ignored, at 
least severely downplayed in significance.  Isaiah Berlin wrote in 1953 that many who 
prioritized Count Tolstoy as a novelist rather than a thinker “have at times looked upon 
the historical and philosophical passages scattered through War and Peace as so much 
perverse interruption of the narrative, as a regrettable liability to irrelevant digression 
characteristic of this great, but excessively opinionated, writer, a lopsided, home-made 
metaphysics of small or no intrinsic interest.”35   
While this did not stay true, and Berlin’s interpretation of Tolstoy as a pluralist 
has proliferated in literary circles, there are two noticeable trends in the analyses offered.  
One is negative, in the sense that there have been mistakes of omission.  Historians, and 
serious considerations of the historical science suggested by Tolstoy, are largely absent 
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from the dialogue surrounding War and Peace.  That absence is a decidedly strange one, 
considering the effort Tolstoy went to ensure his criticism of the historical could not go 
unnoticed, going so far as to drop the narrator voice in the second epilogue and speak in 
no uncertain terms about the errors of historians.  But historians have not taken a great 
deal of trouble to respond to his criticisms, leaving that largely to the efforts of literary 
critics and philosophers.  Equally so, there is little said about actually making an attempt 
to switch the focus of the historical discipline from the particular to the universal.  
Keeping the status quo of the particular, or at least its approximation, informs the other 
important trend, which is one of mistaken interpretation.  There is an alarming amount of 
written work assuring us that Tolstoy was a pluralist, in part due to Isaiah Berlin’s work, 
The Hedgehog and the Fox, as well as other pieces written by the philosophically liberal-
minded, which assign a sort of Skeptic-lite identity to Tolstoy in War and Peace.  For 
Tolstoy to have been a pluralist, he would have needed to assert the validity of multiple 
narratives as holding some truth, which he emphatically does not.  This occurs especially 
when the lives of the characters in War and Peace are brought to discussion.  Many 
readers have interpreted Tolstoy as inconsistent, applying a deterministic worldview only 
with national politics and wars while allowing his individual characters (at least those 
who are not Napoleon or other important generals) the freedom to shape their lives at 
will.  By interpreting an allowance for their free wills, those same readers are able to 
assert a plurality of truths with regards to the experiences of each individual character.  
Both these trends have resulted in the avoidance of the most important aspects of the 
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polemic: a serious re-consideration of the historical discipline, and an inquiry into the 
value of the universal over the particular. 
The Mistake of Omission 
 It is, of course, difficult to write much about something that does not exist.  In 
order to provide analysis despite the absence of substantive responses from historians to 
Tolstoy, responses from all critics of War and Peace will be utilized instead, regardless 
of profession.  At the time War and Peace was published, the great man view of history 
was still quite popular, and Tolstoy’s attack went largely ignored in the political climate 
of the time.  Tolstoy scholar and researcher Jeff Love writes: “This romantic view [the 
great man view] prospered in the first half of the nineteenth century and offers a ready 
justification for autocratic exercises of power, suggesting a fascinating and largely 
unappreciated political dimension to Tolstoy’s novel.”36  The notable exceptions to the 
silence of historians were military historians, who protested Tolstoy’s apparent 
falsification of historical facts regarding battles in the Napoleonic Wars.  Russian military 
historians S. Navalikhin and A.S. Norov took umbrage with Tolstoy’s treatment of 
factual accuracy, as well as Aleksandr Nikolaevich Vitmer, who served in the Russian 
army in 1812 and provides the best critique.37  Aside from clarification of factual events 
depicted by Tolstoy, the engagement of historians with War and Peace has been absent in 
English.  Indeed, as philosopher, social theorist, and intellectual historian Isaiah Berlin 
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points out, philosophical engagement with War and Peace was absent for the better part 
of a century, even while the great man view died off in the historical profession.  The 
immediate reactions of contemporary critics, that Tolstoy wrote excellent novels but 
lacked the abilities of a high-quality thinker, stood for some time.  Philosophical 
engagement with Tolstoy at all mostly prioritized Tolstoy’s later works, after he 
converted to Christianity and turned to religious contemplation.  Writes Berlin: 
“Historians of Russian thought tend to label this [the assertions of determinism in War 
and Peace] aspect of Tolstoy as ‘fatalism,’ and move on to the more interesting historical 
theories of Leont’ev or Danilevsky.”38 
 Boris Eikhenbaum, a Russian-Soviet literary scholar and foundational thinker of 
Russian formalism, was the most prominent scholar of Tolstoy’s works through the first 
half of the twentieth century.  According to Berlin in the 1950s, Eickhenbaum “has 
written the best critical work on Tolstoy in any language,” work which informs Berlin’s 
own understanding of Tolstoy.39  Eikhenbaum engaged in a large amount of research on 
Tolstoy, known as the “Leo Tolstoy project” by Russian language scholar Carol Any.40  
The majority of that effort went into the publication of three volumes—named after 
different decades of the nineteenth century—charting the interests which motivated 
Tolstoy, titled Tolstoi in the Fifties, Tolstoi in the Sixties, and Tolstoi in the Seventies.  In 
those volumes, Eikhenbaum explores the correspondences Tolstoy kept, the projects he 
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worked on, and the interests which arrested him; passages concerning War and Peace are 
written in Tolstoi in the Sixties.  Eikhenbaum’s thesis is that Tolstoy was at heart an 
archaist who disliked the growing historicism of many of his contemporaries, and sought 
to subvert them by positing his contradictory philosophy of history.  Eikhenbaum’s take 
is, much like those of most previous readers of War and Peace, less than impressed.  
Eikhenbaum presents Tolstoy as a restless thinker with regards to historical philosophy.  
During the 1860s, as academic discussion for the establishment of a formal, unified 
historical discipline were intensifying, so too were debates about historical philosophy: 
Earlier, with reference to Tolstoi’s conception of The Decembrists, I pointed out a 
popular interest in historical books and lectures, in memoirs and biographical 
“montages.”  This was characteristic of the early 1860s.  An interest in the 
philosophy of history began at the same time, and had become strong by the mid-
1860s.  This was an interest in generalizations as well as in facts.  Of the general 
questions which were discussed at the time, two emerged as central: the first was 
about how individual freedom and historical necessity are combined, and the 
second was about causality in history.41 
Eikhenbaum therefore finds little unusual about Tolstoy’s interest in the 
philosophy of history, and places him in a rather small camp that developed as the debate 
over philosophy of history intensified: “A circle of ‘original’ thinkers was forming ties to 
Slavophilism and archaic ‘populism.’  This was a party of archaist-eccentrics in which 
the central role was played by Tolstoi’s longstanding friend, S. Urusov.”42  Tolstoy 
followed closely the works of Urusov and fellow “archaist-eccentrics” Y. Samarin and S. 
Yurev, as well as similar intellectual Mikhail Pogodin.  Eikhenbaum analyzes passages 
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from those scholars and notes their similarities to some of the passages in War and 
Peace.  Tolstoy had especially close association with Urusov with regards to the calculus 
of history, the laws behind which were inspirational for their intellectual group: “Tolstoi 
and Urusov were the leaders of this circle, which was combative and kept up the 
traditions of the old Slavophiles; Pogodin was their teacher and authority.  They were 
carried away by their discoveries of the higher laws of history . . . For them, mathematics 
was more than a science; it was a party slogan.”43  In particular, the kind of mathematics 
utilized in Tolstoy’s eccentric circle was Newtonian; the universe was uniform and 
knowable through patterns gleaned from sufficient observation.  Newtonian physics was, 
in the lifetime of Tolstoy’s group, being subverted by questions of probability.  In 
Michael Tondre’s work of literary analysis The Physics of Possibility: Victorian Fiction, 
Science, and Gender, Tondre emphasizes the way growing questions in physics about the 
nature of uncertainty in the universe (since experimentally substantiated in relativity and 
quantum mechanics) were eroding certainty and determinism in literature.  He writes 
concerning the Newtonian assumption of a universe in which cause and effect is uniform: 
”Intellectuals like Bishop Berkely and David Hume noted the purely conjectural nature of 
Newton’s particles, and of course departures from Newton’s materialism were widely 
available in the two centuries leading up to the 1850s, including the theories of Baruch 
Spinoza, Gottfried Leibniz, and Immanuel Kant.”44  Tolstoy rebelled against this 
movement, and thus his strong description and endorsement of a Newtonian, determinist 
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history.  Eikhenbaum’s conclusion about Tolstoy’s philosophy of history is thus 
somewhat dismissive: 
The enigmatic sources and the ideas of the philosophical-historical chapters of 
War and Peace, including even aspects of style and terminology, are beginning to 
become clear.  Tolstoi’s philosophy of history turns out to be “original” only in 
the sense that it opposes contemporary scholarly and publicistic views, and is the 
creation of a circle of “original” thinkers—eccentrics who kept alive the traditions 
and ideas of a past era and were antagonistic toward contemporary life.  Although 
Tolstoi did not avoid historical traumas, he was still the most successful, and 
therefore assumed the most active role in this circle.  War and Peace assumed the 
character of a partisan statement, a declaration on behalf of the 
“noncontemporaries.”45 
 
Eikhenbaum’s assessment, however, is far more biographical than it is philosophical.  He 
passes no judgment on the coherence or applicability on Tolstoy’s philosophy of history, 
and offers no analysis of its worthiness.  Rather, he assigns the work Tolstoy did to 
reconsider the historical science to part of the political movements of the time, an 
historicist, empirical fashion of dealing with Tolstoy which avoids any sort of action. 
 Berlin hoped to take Eikhenbaum’s vast body of research and use it to address the 
critique of history in War and Peace with his short work, The Hedgehog and the Fox.  In 
it he attempts to take Tolstoy’s philosophy of history seriously, and escape the dichotomy 
of Tolstoy as either an incredible novelist or Christian teacher.  Berlin says that he cannot 
help but feel that Tolstoy provides a promising analysis of the historical endeavor.  
Tolstoy has too much interest in history, and provoked such strong feelings of 
antagonism from “ordinarily sane and sympathetic critics—surely there is something here 
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which deserves attention.”46  Despite this declaration of purpose to take Tolstoy 
seriously, Berlin quickly begins to make an odd series of assertions.  The first is that 
Tolstoy only saw epistemological value in empirical facts, and therefore saw history as 
only worthy of study if it could create a real history based on the detailed reconstruction 
of facts.  He comes to this conclusion because of Tolstoy’s dislike for “romanticism, 
abstract formulations, metaphysics,” which is somewhat justifiable since the great men 
view of history falls under the category of romanticism.47  However, to prioritize the 
historical fact as the principle element of Tolstoy’s search for truth in history is counter to 
the persuasive argument offered in War and Peace for a mathematical history.  That 
argument decried the study of the discrete fact in favor of universal natural law, which 
Berlin fails to acknowledge. 
 The failure to acknowledge Tolstoy’s appreciation for the study of universality 
extends further.  He describes Tolstoy as influenced by the “historicism of his time,” even 
though historicism is opposed to any linear or teleological history, which Tolstoy argues 
for.48  Berlin later says that for Tolstoy, “History is plainly not a science,” despite 
Tolstoy’s specific nomination of the historical discipline as a science.49  Berlin goes so 
far as to say, concerning the laws of history, that the sociological sciences “cannot 
possibly have found any, because the number of causes upon which events turn is too 
great for human knowledge or calculation.”50  Berlin wholly misinterprets Tolstoy’s 
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message and ignores his exhortation.  Let us revisit that exhortation, and read with 
Tolstoy’s narrator Tolstoy’s take on the purpose of the historical discipline:  
Any conclusion of historical science, without the least effort on the part of 
criticism, falls apart like dust, leaving nothing behind, only as a result of the fact 
that criticism selects as an object for observation a larger or smaller discrete unit, 
which it always has the right to do, because any chosen historical unit is always 
arbitrary . . . Only by admitting an infinitesimal unit for observation—a 
differential of history, that is, the uniform strivings of people—and attaining to 
the art of integrating them (taking the sums of these infinitesimal quantities) can 
we hope to comprehend the laws of history . . . To study the laws of history, we 
must change completely the object of observation, leave kings, ministers, and 
generals alone, and study the uniform, infinitesimal elements that govern the 
masses.  No one can tell to what extent it is given to man to achieve in this way an 
understanding of the laws of history; but it is obvious that the possibility of 
grasping historical laws lies only on this path, and that on this path human reason 
has not yet made one millionth of those efforts the historians have made in 
describing the deeds of various kings, commanders, and ministers, and in setting 
forth their reflections on the occasion of those deeds.51 
 The political stance behind Berlin’s interpretation becomes clear soon after his 
departure from Tolstoy’s argument.  He asserts not that Tolstoy truly urged us to search 
for the laws of history that govern all men, but to cease that search because we will all of 
us, equally, never understand those laws because they are outside our comprehension.  
Thus Berlin describes Tolstoy as democratic and egalitarian, but also places upon Tolstoy 
the mantle of a negative prophet.  Berlin’s Tolstoy believes that humanity is incapable of 
understanding the universal laws of nature, and therefore should never even attempt to 
seek them.  Berlin refers to Tolstoy’s proposal as nothing more than “an ideal historical 
science,” worth praise as a beautifully written creation from a master thinker, and then 
declares that Tolstoy thought it could never be reached because of human limitation.52  
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His evidence for the claim is based on how Tolstoy treats the agency of the characters.  
Berlin interprets Tolstoy’s rejection of agency, and disparagement of the characters’ self-
obsessions, as an assertion of humanity’s inability to investigate universal natural laws.  
While it is arguable that Tolstoy would deny absolute knowledge derived by finite minds, 
as scholar Jeff Love will do later, this is not the same as Tolstoy saying that all effort to 
explore universal laws is useless.  Berlin combines a proclamation of universal fallibility 
with the earlier interpretation of Tolstoy as fact driven, resulting in an image of Tolstoy 
as a proponent of self-aware ignorance and empiricism.  The Tolstoy drawn by Berlin is, 
as it turns out, far more similar to the historians disparaged by Tolstoy than the type of 
historians capable of creating the historical science envisioned by Tolstoy.  Tolstoy’s 
science of history assumes the uniformity of human striving in the past as well as a 
Newtonian, uniform universe, from which universal laws may be inferred.  The historian 
who disbelieves in the search for universal laws and only seeks more facts could never 
approach natural laws, and would never seek to pursue them.  They are the historians 
Tolstoy accuses of being forgers, the ones who invent falsified, particular truths when 
they think they should abandon pursuing any universal ones.  They are the historians who 
would be worthless except as currency for universities. 
 And thus, for Berlin, and for many scholars after him, Tolstoy’s attempt to create 
a historical science remained in slumber.  Historians persisted to be largely absent from 
the discussion, and literary scholars made the most notable efforts to study War and 
Peace.  Their findings mirrored Berlin’s own.  One notable literary scholar, Gary Saul 
Morson, posited a particularly negative interpretation of the calculus of history, in which 
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Tolstoy’s critique is so complete and impossible to satisfy that it would destroy the 
enterprise of historical study.  He bases the negativity of Tolstoy’s position on the 
unattainability of knowledge in a determinist world: 
Tolstoy refuted the usual interpretation of determinism not on metaphysical but 
rather on epistemological grounds.  He believed that, by their very nature, the 
principles governing human events are incomprehensible to the human mind.  To 
be sure, all events are determined; and, to be sure, if it is once conceded that life 
can be governed by reason, then life is impossible.  But life is possible, because 
reason cannot understand the principles of events and therefore cannot predict as 
the underground man fears.  Tolstoy’s determinism excludes a “table of 
logarithms,” or anything like it.  Although determinism is presumably true, it is 
totally irrelevant to human life and the practice of historiography.  There can 
never be a situation where determinism can resolve any sort of problem . . . Thus, 
determinism is an entirely empty truth.53 
 
Morson criticizes Tolstoy’s articulation of history because Morson believes it necessitates 
complete and total knowledge of all events of the past.  It must therefore be a nihilistic 
history, as some of Tolstoy’s contemporaries complained, which does not stand to close 
inspection.  Morson relies on many of Tolstoy’s later writings, after his disillusionment 
with writing novels and his turn to Orthodox Christianity, to make the point that even 
Tolstoy was not persuaded by the arguments he had given.  Thus Morson, who in all 
fairness is more concerned with the impact of Tolstoy’s work in War and Peace on 
narrative than history, refuses to consider what the historical discipline might be if 
Tolstoy’s broader criticisms were to be addressed. 
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 Despite the vast majority of the reception to War and Peace omitting a serious re-
consideration of history, in the last two decades there has been a tonal shift in the 
discussion of Tolstoy’s proposal, although historians have continued their absence from 
the conversation.  The shift is due to the work of scholar Jeff Love, who in 2004 
published a re-interpretation of Tolstoy’s effort, Overcoming History in War and Peace.  
The second chapter is entirely devoted to explaining and exploring the calculus of 
history, framed by an introductory discussion of the Battle of Borodino.  The Battle of 
Borodino is particularly useful, since it features numerous perspectives of the action 
which were then collapsed into a discussion of each character’s inability to see the whole 
of the battle or enact change on the outcome of events.  Love uses the battle to help 
illustrate Tolstoy’s effort to turn history into the subjugation of individual, particularist 
narratives and viewpoints to universal laws.  While Love does take Tolstoy seriously, and 
defends his proposal against its two most prominent detractors, Berlin and Morson, he is, 
as a literary critic, more concerned with the potential impact Tolstoy could have on 
narrative and art rather than the historical discipline, and thus the serious re-consideration 
of history as a discipline is still absent.   
This is not to say that Love’s interpretation of Tolstoy as advocating a different 
type of narrative is unimportant or useless for the purposes of this paper.  Indeed, the 
work Love has done has reached outside his own circles.  In the August-September, 2005 
issue of The American Mathematical Monthly, mathematics professor Stephen T. Ahearn 
published a short article about how he utilizes War and Peace in his classroom.  Having 
been in correspondence with Jeff Love, Ahearn finds the calculus of history to be an 
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intriguing concept, and describes the analogy to mathematics to be “rich and deep, 
requiring some knowledge of mathematics to fully comprehend their meaning.”54  Ahearn 
introduces Tolstoy’s vision for a historical science to his calculus students in order to 
reinforce their lessons.  He often finds the students easily translate their understanding of 
calculus to Tolstoy’s historical ideas, “and few reject Tolstoy’s use of mathematics as 
inappropriate.”55  However, the type of narrative Love describes as possible under 
Tolstoy’s framework, one which attempts to escape temporality through an integration of 
perspectives, of subject and object, finite and infinite, will be more useful for us later on. 
The Mistake of Interpretation 
The mistake of omission with regards to Tolstoy’s history has, in turn, led to 
significant mistakes of interpretation.  The interpretive mistake with the most significant 
and influential legacy undoubtedly lies within Isaiah Berlin’s Hedgehog and the Fox.  
Whereas Eikhenbaum was a loose inspiration for Berlin and is generally less widely read, 
Berlin has influenced countless readers to understand War and Peace in a particular way.  
He presented Tolstoy as a pluralist, who surrendered to the equal truth of each individual 
character’s story rather than be logically thorough with the deterministic world he 
described.  By omitting a serious consideration of how history might be produced with a 
universalist approach, the terms of Tolstoy’s proposal were lost, and were thus lost for 
many other scholars because of Berlin’s influence.  The interpretation given by Berlin 
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also had a broader political dimension, even beyond academia, literary criticism, or the 
historical discipline.  The Cold War offered a stark context for philosophy, along with the 
post-World War II desire for peace and stability.  In some ways it is no wonder that 
scholars attempted to create knowledge that avoided change, knowledge that would easily 
be consumed in a political environment of liberal democracy.  And although the historian 
may be forgiven for being sympathetic to those who were trying to construct a peaceful 
climate as quickly as possible when all the horrors of Nazism, Stalinism, and world war 
were so fresh in mind, sympathy does not free us from asking ourselves the same 
questions Tolstoy demanded we face, regardless of how conducive to change the answers 
to those questions might be. 
When the global political setting is taken into consideration, it becomes apparent 
that Berlin’s version of War and Peace is driven by an anti-Marxist, pro-liberalism 
viewpoint.  Berlin sees in Tolstoy an affirmation of the particular because he thinks 
Tolstoy celebrates our ignorance as a species by tearing down great men and equating 
them with everyone else: 
What are great men?  They are ordinary human beings who are ignorant and vain 
enough to accept responsibility for the life of society, individuals who would 
rather take the blame for all the cruelties, injustices, disasters justified in their 
name than recognize their own insignificance and impotence in the cosmic flow 
which pursues its course irrespective of their wills and ideals.  This is the central 
point of those passages (in which Tolstoy excelled) in which the actual course of 
events is described, side by side, with the absurd, egocentric explanations which 
persons blown up with the sense of their own importance necessarily give to 
them; as well as of the wonderful descriptions of moments of illumination in 
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which the truth about the human condition dawns upon those who have the 
humility to recognize their own unimportance and irrelevance.56 
 
Here Berlin delivers to us a strange equality, in which no one of our species stands above 
anyone else because all are denied ascent.  It is an equality of ignorance and isolation.  
We are only at our best when we know that we have no importance and affect nothing.  
And, in fairness to Berlin, Tolstoy does declare all of us equally controlled by the 
movements of history; that powerful line, “Kings are the slaves of history,” delivered by 
Tolstoy near the end of his first polemical essay in War and Peace, comes to mind.57  
Berlin’s mistake is equating a recognition of our common ignorance with an affirmation 
of that ignorance.  He omits the authenticity of Tolstoy’s exhortation that we continue 
attempting to find truth despite our ignorance, delivered with such passion and frequency 
in War and Peace.  He equates Tolstoy’s polemic against those who at that time preached 
a false historical gospel with anyone who attempted to find truth: 
Tolstoy arrives at no clear conclusion, only at the view, in some respects like 
Burke’s, that it is better to realise that we understand what goes on as we do in 
fact understand it—much as spontaneous, normal, simple people, uncorrupted by 
theories, not blinded by the dust raised by the scientific authorities, do, in fact, 
understand life—than to seek to subvert such commonsense beliefs, which at least 
have the merit of having been tested by long experience, in favour of pseudo-
sciences, which, being founded on absurdly inadequate data, are only a snare and 
a delusion.  That is his case against all forms of optimistic rationalism, the natural 
sciences, liberal theories of progress, German military expertise, French 
sociology, confident social engineering of all kinds.58 
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But such a Tolstoy would never bother to write War and Peace in the first place.  A 
Tolstoy who truly disbelieved in the human capacity to learn and make progress would 
not have worked so hard to convince us that there are truths governing the progress of the 
world.  Berlin pits himself against Marxist ideals of progress and human achievement, as 
well as any other system, the natural sciences included, which takes on the responsibility 
of change to the human condition.  And thus the final conclusion of Berlin’s 
interpretation is made clear.  It is an interpretation of pluralistic futility, an abandonment 
of any hope of progress for peace, a voluntary enslavement to an unidentified god. 
Berlin’s analysis has lined up fairly nicely with the course of western academic 
influences as well as of the globally political.  Few would dispute that the humanities in 
the West went through significant trauma in the Second World War, and came out of that 
conflict with substantial aversion to any sense of active political radicalism, but more 
importantly to any sense of progressive change in the way humans exist.  Dropping the 
nuclear bombs, the organized efficiency in death camps and utilization of scientific 
experiments on humans during the Holocaust, Stalin’s crimes against humanity during 
industrialization while espousing the justification of progress; all these were markers of 
human technological advancement.  But these advancements did not, as according to 
modernist sensibilities, result in better living conditions for humanity or promote unity in 
our species.  And so, out of those traumas, the political sensibilities of the humanities 
began to shift, and narratives like the one given by Berlin became immensely popular.  
Berlin did not ask us, as the moderns and revolutionary thinkers from the Enlightenment 
to the early twentieth century so often did, to challenge what it means to be human, to 
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attain mastery over the natural world.  Berlin was a preacher of a different sort.  Berlin 
preached that the impulse to fight our ignorance is so inhuman it should be stifled.  
Because we know so little, reaching greater understandings will only result in the 
capability to cause more destruction, rather than produce any worthy results for our 
species.  To make the point, Berlin relied on Tolstoy as someone with great artistic 
standing so it could seem as though there was an authority greater than Berlin who had 
already delivered the same gospel. The Tolstoy who urged humanity to seek universal 
natural law and submit our entire species to those laws is lost, and Berlin casts a Tolstoy 
who gave up on any chance for human universality, even the universality of submission.  
His strategy largely worked; he appealed to a large number of scholars in the humanities 
who possessed the same disposition toward potential progress, and his misinterpretation 
became the dominant interpretation of War and Peace in academic circles. 
Gary Saul Morson’s interpretation is quite similar to Berlin’s.  Morson relies 
heavily on Tolstoy in his later life, who became disillusioned with progress entirely, and 
Morson conflates progress and determinism to some degree in Hidden in Plain View.  He 
thus offers essentially the same view as Berlin: that Tolstoy was resigned to some degree 
of relativism and, going further than Berlin, that Tolstoy had an entirely negative view of 
the historical enterprise.  But, as Jeff Love points out in The Overcoming of History in 
War and Peace, Morson’s interpretation of the calculus of history is subtly different from 
what is actually posited by the narrator: 
The problem is to suppose that the narrator means calculus to apply to causes, 
“infinitesimally small causes,” as a response to the demand that every single 
individual be described in some fashion. If that were the case, then one would 
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have little choice but to infer that the narrator’s alleged solution to the problems 
of correct, i.e. holistic, historical narrative is empty and, perhaps, even 
deliberately so. Alternatively, one could simply hold that the narrator entertains 
contradictory points of view in regard to the possibility of knowledge of historical 
events. While the narrator clearly advocates the impossibility of obtaining 
knowledge by means of the causes of a historical event, he just as clearly does not 
leave the matter at that. Instead, he maintains that the proper object of history is 
the discovery of the laws that govern history. The unadorned nerve of the issue is 
that calculus applies to motion without regard to an enumeration of the relevant 
causes —the emphasis is on “how” not “why.”59 
 
 
Love is able to reconcile the Tolstoy who disbelieves in the human capacity to attain all 
knowledge and the Tolstoy who urges us to search for greater laws in history.  The 
goalposts for Tolstoy’s history, according to the interpretations of Berlin and Morson, 
had been moved to perfect knowledge of the entire past.  Love moves those goalposts to a 
more reasonable and honest position: the search for governing laws of history.  In 
mathematics, laws are not discovered through the meticulous and infinite process of 
subjecting all possible numbers to testing in the laws of mathematics.  Laws are inferred 
through observation and reason.  The same may be true of history, as Tolstoy’s narrator 
points out, in a rebellion against the physical uncertainty being discovered by the sciences 
and thematically explored in the humanities in Tolstoy’s own time.  Such uncertainty 
might leave too much room for human action and freedom, antithetical to the submission 
urged by Tolstoy. 
Even after Jeff Love’s work to reconsider conventional interpretations of War and 
Peace, Berlin’s version, as presented in The Hedgehog and the Fox, still remains 
dominant.  In professor of Slavic literature Hugh McLean’s 2008 In Quest of Tolstoy, he 
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concludes the book with the chapter “Foxes into Hedgehogs: Berlin and Tolstoy.”  The 
chapter is written as an explanation of Berlin’s essay, and draws out the themes Berlin 
saw in War and Peace.  McLean also offers an analysis of Berlin’s writing, and writes 
that the same conclusion Berlin came to about Tolstoy was necessitated by Berlin’s own 
personality.  He specifically cites pluralism: 
The over-arching theory that Berlin-as-hedgehog eventually discovered was 
essentially a canonization of foxiness.  He gave it the name of “pluralism” . . . 
Both liberty and equality are values, but they are at least partly incompatible.  As 
Berlin puts it, “total liberty for the wolves is death to the lambs.”  There is not and 
never will be a perfect world where all contradictions will be solved.  All efforts 
to coerce mankind into a final solution are morally wrong because they present 
suffering in the name of abstract and probably unattainable happiness in the 
future.  The answer, therefore, is compromise.60 
McLean’s finding is that Berlin was able to satisfy himself with this conclusion, whereas 
Tolstoy continued to live in pain and self-inflicted misery because he was unwilling to 
compromise as a Christian in his old age.  He affirms Berlin’s interpretation that the 
message to be taken from War and Peace is a pluralistic truth that Tolstoy could not hold 
onto for long: “It was the image of this Tolstoy, a Tolstoy torn by terrible inner conflicts, 
that Berlin perceived so penetratingly and invoked so powerfully at the end of his essay . 
. . self-blinded in an intense, decades-long, but ultimately futile effort to stifle the rich, 
varied, pluralistic talent he was born with.”61 
 Philosopher Lina Steiner also offers a pluralistic understanding of Tolstoy in War 
and Peace.  In 2009, she published the article “Tolstoy, Liberal and Pluralist: On 
"Personality" and the Protagonist in "War and Peace," in the journal Russian History.  
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Interestingly enough, she does not reference Berlin’s work, but her characterization of 
Tolstoy is quite similar to Berlin’s and McLean’s, and seems to follow in a similar 
interpretive tradition to that established by Berlin.  Steiner’s position is that Tolstoy drew 
inspiration for the formation of the protagonists in War and Peace from a strong affinity 
for liberal education.  She illustrates the trips Tolstoy took to French, German, and 
English schools in order to acquaint himself with the forms of liberal education as the 
reason for his affinity with the Decembrist revolution, which featured more prominently 
in earlier drafts of War and Peace.  Pierre Bezukhov, originally named Pyotr Labazov in 
those earlier drafts, was loosely modeled on Tolstoy’s own Decembrist relative, S.G. 
Volkonskii.62  The reading Steiner presents, based on the way Tolstoy conducted research 
into liberal education and began writing War and Peace, is of War and Peace as an 
examination of “the rise of modernity in Russia by tracing the development of a modern 
individual,” and “to give his compatriots a firm sense of identity and raise their morale by 
reminding them about Russian’s [sic] glorious recent past.”63  In other words, Steiner’s 
thesis is that Tolstoy wrote the book to advance the ideal of the liberal individual and 
portray a nationalistic sense of Russian identity.  These, of course, are both particularist, 
rather than universalist, goals.  She even characterizes Tolstoy’s philosophy of history as 
particularist: 
 
The new worldview that Tolstoy develops in the 1860s in conjunction with his 
elaboration of the architectonic of his narrative is pluralistic, by which I mean that 
Tolstoy no longer presents historical development as a single trajectory in the 
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novel, but rather comes to see it as a complex system consisting of multiple 
“chronotopes” and multiple intellectual paradigms.  History for Tolstoy is no 
longer an objective process that unfolds according to any specific predetermined 
scenario (that is, on which given the totality of causal factors, would always 
unfold the way it does).  This indeterminacy makes it a genuine “semiosphere” 
populated by various cultural personalities, each of whom possess a unique 
project and identity.64 
 
This interpretation is in direct contradiction with the history that Tolstoy describes in War 
and Peace.  Tolstoy spends a remarkable amount of time establishing history as 
deterministic in the novel, and Steiner ignores the calculus of history he formulates and 
all the other work he does to criticize the methods of historians.  If anything, Steiner’s 
approach is even pre-Berlin, in that she intentionally ignores the essay on historical 
philosophy throughout War and Peace in favor of a literary analysis of characters.  But 
her conclusion is nevertheless the same: Tolstoy writes War and Peace as a pluralist with 
liberal inclinations, and the way different characters have their own, highly differing 
stories with the appearance of agency and influence on their futures is the evidence for 
such a conclusion. 
There are some works which have attempted to embrace the determinism and 
universalism that so many thinkers have ignored or dismissed in War and Peace.  In 
1962, RF Christian published a book called Tolstoy’s War and Peace: A Study.  
Christian’s focus is much more focused on the structures of the book’s writing, through a 
“complex series of antitheses, juxtapositions and repetitions” as Jeff Love writes.65  But 
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Christian nevertheless affirms “a thoroughgoing determinism which Tolstoy’s 
countervailing assertion of individual freedom does not contradict, since, for Christian, 
the latter is only a psychological perception, an illusion of sorts.”66  But by far the most 
influential writer on a universalist Tolstoy is Jeff Love.  Overcoming History in War and 
Peace offers a more intensely analytical effort at taking Tolstoy seriously with regards to 
a philosophy of history.  Love’s thesis lacks the pluralist, liberalist, and defeatist 
conclusions of many of his predecessors in Tolstoyan scholarship; instead he argues that 
Tolstoy consolidates determinism and human effort, an argument that helps us understand 
the apparent contradictions posed by Tolstoy’s reason for writing the book in the first 
place.  The word he uses to signify the consolidation is “striving.”  He describes the 
tenuous balance thusly: 
The distance of man from God is measured by freedom, an illusion of possibility 
and independence that deludes the finite mind to presume well beyond its capacity 
and so dooms it to learn by suffering, by recognizing its own limitation, a tragic 
shortness of breath. This path of learning, the great rhythm of War and Peace , 
vibrantly echoes the central conflict of Greek epic and tragedy between man and 
gods within the thoroughly Christian context of Tolstoy’s field of vision—the 
distance between man and God, different orders of being, is the space of 
Tolstoyan evil . For Tolstoy freedom and evil are intimately linked. Man’s 
illusion of freedom compels him to transgress, to ignore and profane that divine 
rationality to which he has scant access; it is the source and primary tool of his 
disobedience and the endless struggle that accompanies it. This struggle leads to 
pain—enlightenment is always a questionable gift—because through it man learns 
of his weakness and dependence, that he is but one “link,” to quote Pierre, in a 
great chain of being that he neither originates nor can hope to master. For Tolstoy, 
learning is precisely this education in human limitation, the realization that we are 
an integral part of a greater whole that functions according to the laws of a deity 
that always lies beyond the reach of rational explanation. The path from evil to 
good, from ignorance to knowledge, from falsehood into truth is marked by an 
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increasing acknowledgment of the mysterious linkage, the astonishing 
interconnection, of all living things.67 
 
The basis for Love’s argument, as may be noted in the opening line of his 
conclusion above, is the finite mind.  The finite mind is individual human’s reason, 
capable of understanding the existence of higher laws, but incapable of completely 
grasping them in and of themselves because those laws are effectively infinite.  But the 
finite mind nevertheless continues to strive to understand, a process of learning in which 
the finite mind is more and more impressed with its own infinite unimportance as an 
individual, and therefore a process that is inevitably painful.  As Love notes, human 
striving is viewed in different ways throughout the novel.  Napoleon’s attempt to 
dominate Europe is evil because it arises from the selfish desires of an individual, 
whereas the efforts of calculus are held up as a glorious exploration of the universe which 
may benefit all.  In a similar sense, as Love puts it: “For Prince Andrei freedom is power; 
for Pierre it is recognition of powerless, acquiescence to necessity, that allows one to be 
freed from the cycle of struggle that characterizes finite existence.”68  Both of the 
examples on the far sides of the spectrum, Napoleon and Platon Karataev, symbolize an 
incomplete human.  Napoleon does not understand humility, and Karataev lacks the 
human drive for any understanding of the universal.  Thus the determinism of humanity 
posited by Tolstoy is not only that we are predestined to live and die in some vague way.  
We are determined to ever attempt the impossible, to never be satisfied as finite beings in 
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the face of infinite understanding.  And so, for Love, Tolstoy does not leave us with an 
empty philosophy of history that negates the historical enterprise.  Rather, Tolstoy wants 
us to know why the historical enterprise exists at all, and encourages us to continue 
searching for truth despite our limitations: “That there is no way out, that the whole 
cannot be known but also not discarded as a goal of knowledge—here is the animate 
force of the novel.”69   
It is clear that Tolstoy favors the end of the spectrum on which Platon Karataev 
rests.  Karataev exists without attachment, divorced from particularity.  In the edited 
collection of essays Tolstoy on War: Narrative Art and Historical Truth in “War and 
Peace,” Love also wrote a chapter, titled “The Great Man in War and Peace.”  He gives 
closer attention to what Karataev represents for Tolstoy: “Karataev’s life is a life without 
partial commitments or ties.  In this sense it is a sovereign life—and a most estranged and 
estranging one . . . No other character in the novel quite achieves this sovereignty . . . 
Karataev represents a wisdom hardly practicable in the world, or, better, hardly tolerable 
in the world.”70  But as Love notes, Karataev’s way of life, without particularity or 
attachment, is an impossibility for Tolstoy because of our finitude.  The human is that 
which strives, which exists in the face of the universal with its own particularity 
Tolstoy’s perfect solution is the wise man, who “is neither great nor a man.  Indeed, he is 
neither god nor man, neither master nor slave, neither active nor passive.  He retains 
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negatively the binary logic of either-or, of excluded middle, in setting that logic aside as 
undecidable.”71  Thus Tolstoy’s pessimism is demonstrated; his own paragon of peace 
and wisdom is unobtainable.  Even the answer humans give to the universal as particular 
beings, our efforts to understand it, fall flat, the only possible recourse absolute 
submission and negative existence, without particularity or universality.  Love’s 
description of Tolstoy’s wisdom is nuanced, and gives far greater use in understanding 
history.  But Love’s analysis is chiefly important for elucidating the failure and 
pessimism inherent in that wisdom, providing us with a clear image of the route to be 
avoided if a new potential history is to live up to its claims of agency and choice. 
It is no exaggeration to say that a great deal has been written about War and 
Peace.  It is also no exaggeration to say that most of the literature has been quite similar 
due to basic mistakes of interpretation: War and Peace is an excellent novel, but far less 
excellent as a philosophical work, or can be reduced to a skeptical, pluralistic narrative.  
Very little written on War and Peace addresses any sense of the proposal Tolstoy gives to 
revitalize the historical discipline; i.e., end traditions of self-aggrandizement, maintain a 
higher goal of knowledge to which all historical effort is given, etc.  The avoidance of 
Tolstoy’s critique is likely due in part to Tolstoy’s position in the midst of the debates on 
philosophy of history during his own time, a position of archaism opposed to the 
scientific developments occurring in history at the time.  Eikhenbaum places Tolstoy in a 
very small, eccentric group of people with similar mindsets, and thus the perception of 
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Tolstoy’s critique as somewhat embarrassing.  In later decades, Tolstoy’s voice fell on 
the ears of those with exceedingly different political ends, such as Isaiah Berlin.  Berlin’s 
avoidance of the universalism Tolstoy illustrates seems to have been performed in order 
to affirm the pluralism of liberal democracy during the Cold War, and the majority of 
scholars of Tolstoy following Berlin have at the very least used his interpretation as 
foundational to their own.  Even Love’s work, insightful as it is, only gives enough of an 
interpretation to serve as the foundation for rebuilding the practices of historians.  To be 
frank, Love need not do more; he is, after all, not a historian.  We have not given 
Tolstoy’s argument the consideration it deserves, and have essentially continued to 
engage in similar practices as he saw a century and a half ago, even before our discipline 
had been formally established.  We are guilty of the mistake of omission regarding 
Tolstoy’s encouragement that we seek the universal rather than continue on in pursuit 
through the particular.  We have not even searched far enough to discover the pessimism 
Tolstoy encouraged after reaching for the universal, much less have we considered a way 
out of that pessimism.    But that is not to say we have not understood some basic 
difficulty extant in the problem of writing history through particular means (the 
investigations of historical facts by particular historians).  Historians have considered this 








HISTORIANS GRAPPLING WITH THE PARTICULAR AND THE UNIVERSAL 
 Historians have not engaged with Tolstoy in War and Peace with the 
thoroughness Tolstoy’s polemic deserves.  Historians have not addressed the issues 
Tolstoy raises concerning the academic system history was involved in as self-interested, 
nor have historians been thorough in challenging Tolstoy’s pessimism and determinism.  
The fall of the great man view was replaced with a general sense of agency over 
historical happenings possessed by all peoples, which does not address Tolstoy’s problem 
with the presumption of agency in historical works.  Other philosophers and thinkers 
have worked to address what Tolstoy has to say about history, but as illustrated in 
Chapter 2, most of their efforts fall short of considering the nuances demonstrated by 
Tolstoy in his argumentation.  Jeff Love, as a literary scholar, comes closest by casting 
Tolstoy as deterministically identifying the human as finite, but that identification does 
not have the type of solution for the future of the historical discipline searched for in this 
work.  Historians have not picked up where Love left off, and considered Tolstoy as an 
entry point with which to think about the human as particular in the midst of the 
universal, what that dichotomy means, and how the historical discipline may feature in 
that dichotomy.   
However, to say that historians have not attempted at all to philosophize as to the 
epistemological nature of historical works would be unfair.  It is rarely framed as clearly 
as by Love, or as strenuously as in War and Peace.  But the tension identified by Love, 
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that of the finite in the face of the effectively infinite, the particular in opposition to the 
universal, has still been explored.  Leopold von Ranke sought historical truth in textual 
evidence in German idealist fashion, and R.G. Collingwood saw history as an endeavor 
of self-investigation.  Edward Hallett Carr has speculated as to the construction of the 
historical fact, and Hayden White wrote a now infamous book clearly identifying 
historical work as created narrative.  Those scholars also tend to occupy an uneasy 
position with regards to the historian’s view of action.  Most historians focus on the past 
by investigating historical sources.  The historians listed above, who undertake 
philosophical investigations as to the methods and purposes of history, emphasize the 
role of the historian’s present context in understanding the past.  Few historians, however, 
and none of those previously named, are overtly concerned with encouraging action for 
the sake of future humanity based on knowledge of the past.  Historians are generally, 
therefore, passive.  The knowledge they write is not for any path of action, but for its own 
creation.  Not only are they passive, which hinders the creation of universal future for 
humanity, they also tend to be firmly entrenched in the tradition Isaiah Berlin so 
staunchly advocated for, namely, pluralist particularity.  Historians generally do not see a 
significant problem with writing history from their own limited perspectives, as long as 
historical evidence can support the relevant argument. 
 There are, however, some historians who sense the problem of the individually 
produced narrative and seek different methodological approaches hoped to solve the 
problem of a finite mind characterizing the past.  These attempts have been more notable 
for the nature of the challenge than for their effectiveness in dealing with the heart of the 
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problem.  Such subversive works are nevertheless still notable, and the methods they 
demonstrate are worth analysis to investigate how close they came to overcoming the 
particular-universal tension, and why they were unable to do so.  Histories have been 
written that embrace the fallibility of the particular and are written with qualifications and 
exposure of the method of research at every step, like Steven Bednarski’s A Poisoned 
Past: The Life and Times of Margarida de Portu, a Fourteenth-Century Accused 
Poisoner.  Some histories have been written which feature opposing narratives which are 
supported by historical facts.  The Many Deaths of Jew Süss: The Notorious Trial and 
Execution of an Eighteenth-Century Court Jew, written by Yair Mintzker, is a recent and 
notable historical work which attempts to evade the issue of an individually-written 
history by incorporating multiple, opposing voices into the narrative constructed by the 
author.  The exploration of these attempts is deserved both for the sake of the effort 
committed by their authors and for the sake of argumentative thoroughness.  Both the 
historical-philosophical and historical works written for the sake of solving the particular-
universal tension with regards to historical truth are thus objects of interest. 
Historical-Philosophical Explorations 
Leopold von Ranke, a German historian in the nineteenth-century, is largely 
credited with founding a scientific approach to history, through the collection of vast 
amounts of data from historical documents, and is regarded as one of the most the most 
influential historians on the professional historical discipline.  In the 1973 edited and 
translated volume Theory and Practice of History, Georg G. Iggers and Konrad von 
Moltke introduce Ranke as one of the first historians to advocate the study of political 
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narratives as the most scientific form of history: “Ranke let the facts speak for 
themselves; and since history was past politics, these facts were contained primarily in 
the documents of state.  The method of Ranke, it was believed, pointed above all to 
detailed monographic studies.”72  In the US and Britain, especially, the type of 
misconstruance defined by Iggers and Moltke, of Ranke as a pure empiricist obsessed 
with the endless collection of facts, has been massively influential.  In the Anglo-
American intellectual sphere, “He was viewed as the prototype of the technically trained 
historian and as a great representative of the positivistic scientific tradition of the 
nineteenth century, a contemporary of Lyell, Wallace, Darwin, and Renan.”73  Ranke has 
thus been largely recognized only for his influence on the formation of the discipline and 
erroneously linked with an outdated methodological approach. 
But, as Iggers and Moltke point out, Ranke’s history has greater nuance than pure 
empiricism.  In On the Relations of History and Philosophy, an essay from the 1830s 
published in The Theory and Practice of History, Ranke describes the division between 
history and philosophy, as well as the appropriate analytical methods to be undertaken by 
the historian: 
There are two ways of acquiring knowledge about human affairs—through the 
perception of the particular and through abstraction.  The one is the way of 
philosophy, the other that of history . . . These two sources of knowledge are 
therefore to be kept clearly distinguished.  Nevertheless, equally mistaken are 
those historians who view all of history merely as an immense aggregate of facts 
to be committed to memory, meaning that particulars are strung to particulars and 
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all of these held together only by a common moral principle.  I am of the opinion, 
rather, that historical science at its best is both called upon and able to rise in its 
own way from the investigation and contemplation of the particular to a general 
view of events and to the recognition of their objectively existing relatedness.74 
 
Historians, for Ranke, must explore the particular facts of history in and of themselves 
(he says that a historian must have a “feeling for and a joy in the particular in and by 
itself”), but equally important to the investigation of facts and the discovery of 
themselves as they are is to analyze them and their connectedness to the whole of human 
history.  Both the individual particulars and their connectedness explored by Ranke, in 
the tradition of German idealists, served in the greater plan of God, as pointed out by 
Iggers and Moltke: “Ranke’s conception of history, thus, involves not merely a method 
but a firm religious faith and a highly speculative philosophy shared by much of the 
German idealistic tradition in the Geisteswissenschaften in the nineteenth century.”75  
Ranke’s history, therefore, is still about discovery, despite its attachment to a unifying, 
divine plan.  It neglects the focus necessary for future action to create history differently; 
Ranke’s theism, as theism influenced other German idealists, leads to an approach to 
history which ignores the need for future action.  Nothing needs to be actively created in 
the present and future if the being of truth already resides in all temporality as a 
manifestation of God.  Misunderstood and simplified by non-German scholars as he was, 
Ranke nevertheless lacked the action orientation necessitated by a history that can 
overcome the particular-universal tension. 
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 English philosopher, historian, and archaeologist R.G. Collingwood, like most 
twentieth-century historical-philosophers, was in opposition to the pure empirical 
positivity held dear by many followers of Ranke.  In his 1946 posthumously published 
work (for which he is now best known), The Idea of History, he charted the progression 
of philosophies of history through the mid-twentieth-century, and preceded the works of 
Edward Hallett Carr and Hayden White.  He viewed the results of empirical positivism as 
unfinished.  Only the first stage of that methodology, the collection of immense numbers 
of facts, was ever accomplished, and the next stage, the use of those facts to determine 
general laws of history was never achieved.  Even the goal of greater knowledge about 
history ended in irrelevance for the sake of more fact collection: “The historical 
conscience identified itself with an infinite scrupulosity about any and every isolated 
matter of fact.  The ideal of universal history was swept aside as a vain dream, and the 
ideal of historical literature became the monograph.”76  Collingwood was one of the 
earliest historical constructionists who questioned how the historian actually creates 
history as a product of their own temporal context.  For Collingwood, all of historical 
writing is an exploration of self-knowledge on behalf of the historian.  The exploration 
holds both on the level of the individual historian and for the collective efforts of all 
humans in history, as Collingwood describes in the introduction of The Idea of History: 
History is ‘for’ human self-knowledge.  It is generally thought to be of importance 
to man that he should know himself: where knowing himself means knowing not 
his merely personal peculiarities, the things that distinguish him from other men, 
but his nature as man.  Knowing yourself means knowing, first, what it is to be a 
man; secondly, knowing what it is to be the kind of man you are; and thirdly, 
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knowing what it is to be the man you are and nobody else is.  Knowing yourself 
means knowing what you can do; and since nobody knows what he can do until 
he tries, the only clue to what man can do is what man has done.  The value of 
history, then is that teaches us what man has done and thus what man is.77 
 
Collingwood does not assert history as an avenue by which to create a humanity in the 
future.  Historical thought is a path by which to understand human thought; our own 
exploration and reconstruction of the past motivations of humans teaches us about how 
we are now.  Historical thought enables us to learn about the present state of humanity as 
informed by the past, and is not a tool to create a future humanity based on events in the 
past. 
 To say Collingwood does not view history as a tool to create a future humanity is 
to say that he disbelieves in the possibility of permanent progress.  He affirms the use of 
history to create change, although he leaves mentions of that until the last paragraph of 
The Idea of History, as he is more concerned with history as a way to study the human 
mind as a present-focused object of experience.  His view is pessimistic: 
If we want to abolish capitalism or war, and in doing so not only to destroy them 
but to bring into existence something better, we must begin by understanding 
them: seeing what the problems are which our economic or international system 
succeeds in solving, and how the solution of these is related to the other problems 
which it fails to solve.  This understanding of the system we set out to supersede 
is a thing which we must retain throughout the work of superseding it, as a 
knowledge of the past conditioning our creation of the future.  It may be 
impossible to do this; our hatred of the thing we are destroying may prevent us 
from understanding it, and we may love it so much that we cannot destroy it 
unless we are blinded by such hatred.  But if that is so, there will once more, as so 
often in the past, be change but no progress; we shall have lost our hold on one 
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group of problems in our anxiety to solve the next.  And we ought by now to 
realize that no kindly law of nature will save us from the fruits of our ignorance.78 
 
The approach to history-as-informing-action taken by Collingwood is strikingly similar to 
that of Tolstoy.  History may inform, but to act on it in an attempt to create something 
better for the future—to engage in the manifestation of desire—solves no problem.  
Tolstoy adds greater nuance by including an explicit dialogue of the particular-universal 
tension as part of human nature, but Collingwood nevertheless echoes the pessimism so 
prevalent in War and Peace, alongside a dialogue about the individual as a knowledge 
constructor through the mind of the historian. 
 Collingwood quite elegantly describes the historian as a particular kind of 
investigator.  The historical enterprise is concerned with the past, of course, but not the 
past generally.  The historian is specifically interested in human history.  Thus historical 
investigation has two dimensions according to Collingwood, the outside and the inside of 
an historical question.  The outside of the question concerns the circumstantial elements 
of the relevant question, with regards to “bodies and their movements;” for example, as 
Collingwood writes, “the passage of Caesar, accompanied by certain men, across a river 
called the Rubicon at one date or the spilling of his blood on the floor of the senate-house 
at another.”79  The inside of an historical question is more difficult to penetrate because it 
cannot be constructed from the evidence of documents alone.  The inside is concerned 
with the motivations of the historical actors concerned.  In Collingwood’s example, the 
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inside element of the investigation regards why Brutus would kill Caesar, that is, “What 
did Brutus think, which made him decide to stab Caesar?”80  Thus historical thought is 
not only an investigation of the past, but an investigation of human thought, which 
Collingwood believes to be the primary importance that history has with regards to 
gaining humanity self-knowledge.  The process by which this knowledge is generated is 
necessarily through construction taken on by the individual historian as a presentist 
enterprise: “But how does the historian discern the thoughts which he is trying to 
discover?  There is only one way in which it can be done: by re-thinking them in his own 
mind.  The historian of philosophy, reading Plato, is trying to know what Plato thought 
when he expressed himself in certain words.  The only way in which he can do this is by 
thinking it for himself.”81  For Collingwood, the particular-universal tension has no 
solution because history is always an individual-driven enterprise which can only result 
in change, but never progress.  Collingwood’s analysis is presentist and maintains the 
intellectual status quo of the historical discipline in practice. 
In 1961, Edward Hallett Carr described historians and histories in What is 
History? as products of their own times, cultures, and places, following quite closely in 
the footsteps of Collingwood’s work.  He explored what it means to produce historical 
works, and how “historical facts” come to be so.  His opposed the common eighteenth-
century principle that facts may speak for themselves and must only be discovered: 
This is, of course, untrue.  The facts speak only when the historian calls on them: 
it is he who decides to which facts to give the floor, and in what order or context . 
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. . The only reason why we are interested to know that the battle was fought at 
Hastings in 1066 is that historians regard it as a major historical event.  It is the 
historian who has decided for his own reasons that Caesar’s crossing of that petty 
stream, the Rubicon, is a fact of history, whereas the crossing of the Rubicon by 
millions of other people before or since interests nobody at all.  The fact that you 
arrived in this building half an hour ago on foot, or on a bicycle, or in a car, is just 
as much a fact about the past as the fact that Caesar crossed the Rubicon.  But it 
will probably be ignored by historians.82 
 
Carr characterizes writing history as a matter of construction, of selection and 
interpretation of facts of the past by historians into a coherent narrative.  Noting the 
tenuous position of objectivity considering those conditions, Carr attempts to mediate 
between the myth of historians as merely recounting historical facts and of historians as 
freely creating narratives suited to their tastes, regardless of the body of facts.  The 
solution Carr shakily arrives at is to place historians in a purely historicist position: “The 
relation of man to his environment is the relation of the historian to his theme.  The 
historian is neither the humble slave, nor the tyrannical master, of his facts.  The relation 
between the historian and his facts is one of equality, of give-and-take.”83  Carr’s 
analysis, however, is poorly expressed; if historians and facts give and take between each 
other, then why the previous characterization of facts as only relevant when decided so 
by historians?  The attempt to historicize historians makes no sense without some other 
motivating force to adjudicate facts as having power in a context outside the historian’s 
esteem. 
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 Carr thus attempts to avoid the particular-universal tension by relying on 
“society” as a powerful, independent construct which can itself influence the outcome of 
historical writings, regardless of the efforts of individuals.  He opposes even the notion of 
individuals as a functional unit with which to think of history, in the context of both 
historical individuals (actors) or historians (narrators):  
The common-sense view of history treats it as something written by individuals 
about individuals.  This view was certainly taken and encouraged by nineteenth-
century liberal historians, and is not in substance incorrect.  But it now seems 
over-simplified and inadequate, and we need to probe deeper.  The knowledge of 
the historian is not his exclusive individual possession: men, probably, of many 
generations and of many different countries have participated in accumulating it.  
The men whose actions the historian studies were not isolated individuals acting 
in a vacuum: they acted in the context, and under the impulse of a past society.  In 
my last lecture I described history as a process of interaction, a dialogue between 
the historian in the present and the facts of the past.  I now want to enquire into 
the relative weight of the individual and social elements on both sides of the 
equation.  How far are historians single individuals, and how far products of their 
society and their period?84 
 
As a socialist, Carr raises society up to be a force equal or even greater than the efforts of 
individual actors, a force that is impossible to control.  Individuals cannot operate apart 
from society; they are subject to the collective.  But Carr offers no groundbreaking path 
forward based on that evaluation.  He does not advocate for performing history in a new 
or different way in order to explicitly orient the discipline to a universal future for 
humanity.  In fairness to Carr, he wrote earlier in his career, during the Second World 
War, that there should be a massive economic overhaul to construct socialism in Western 
countries in his book, Conditions of Peace.  In Conditions of Peace, however, he wrote 
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within the realm of international politics rather than the philosophy of history, and did not 
incorporate the two.  In What is History, the work where he concerns himself with the 
philosophy of history, he states that historians write reconstructions rather than true 
accounts, and leaves his analysis at that.  His final conclusions are disappointingly vague.  
He asserts himself as opposed to the many conservative voices present among politicians 
and historians during his time: “they have nothing to offer us but the warning to mistrust 
radical and far-reaching ideas, to shun anything that savours of revolution, and to 
advance—if advance we must—as slowly and cautiously as we can . . . this seems to me 
a singular blindness.”85  But, on the other hand, Carr makes no commitment to action, to 
any plan or goal for historians.  He is content with a passive optimism: “For myself I 
remain an optimist . . . I shall look out on a world in tumult and a world in travail, and 
shall answer [conservative opinions] in the well-worn words of a great scientist: ‘And 
yet—it moves.’”86  So while Carr is not opposed to change, and even favors progress, he 
offers no concrete plan to reconstruct the historical discipline for the sake of universality. 
 In 1973, American literary historian Hayden White set out in Metahistory: The 
Historical Imagination in 19th-Century Europe to expose the underlying linguistic 
structures which historians utilized in the nineteenth-century to create appeals for their 
histories.  His method is to take different successful historians and philosophers of history 
and analyze the historical writing style of each using a Formalist approach to the 
linguistic constructions utilized in their works: “For arguments there are the modes of 
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Formism, Organicism, Mechanism, and Contextualism; for emplotments there are the 
archetypes of Romance, Comedy, Tragedy, and Satire; and for ideological implication 
there are the tactics of Anarchism, Conservatism, Radicalism, and Liberalism.”87  He also 
includes a poetic analysis of the linguistic strategies used by historians, which he labels 
Metaphor, Metonymy, Synecdoche, and Irony.  White also concludes there is no 
substantial difference between historical work and historical-philosophical work in terms 
of writing, only in terms of the emphasis placed on analyzing historical events as opposed 
to historical methods/thought.  White’s general conclusions about writing history, and the 
different philosophical approaches used by historians, are alarmingly relativistic for some 
historians: 
There are no apodictically certain theoretical grounds on which one can 
legitimately claim an authority for any one of the modes over the others as being 
more “realistic” . . . as a consequence of this, we are indentured to a choice among 
contending interpretative strategies in any effort to reflect on history-in-general . . 
. as a corollary of this, the best grounds for choosing one perspective on history 
rather than another are ultimately aesthetic or moral rather than epistemological.88 
 
Any attempts, therefore, to “scientize” history, to create a discipline which takes a 
mathematical, purely logic-based approach to the laws of history and use scientific 
methods (much like Tolstoy urged) “represents only the statement of a preference for a 
specific modality of historical conceptualization, the grounds of which are either moral or 
aesthetic, but the epistemological justification of which still remains to be established.”89 
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 When White refers to the possibility for history to be written in terms of moral 
and aesthetic parameters, he refers only to the narrative constructed around the facts.  
White proceeds, for hundreds of pages after the preface in which he gives his thesis, to 
write a regressive history.  He provides evidential support for his argument based on the 
historical documents of the historians and philosophers he studies, and supposes the 
evidences therein to be self-evident enough for his argument to stand.   He writes a 
history that is based on the primacy of facts; as early as page five of Metahistory, he 
refers to the historian’s task as the “arrangement of data from the unprocessed historical 
record in the interest of rendering that record more comprehensible to an audience of a 
particular kind.”90  The facts, the past, the evidences to be discovered, and thus the 
unaltered material of historical truth takes precedence over the interpretation offered by 
historians.  Historians only differ in their arrangement of the data, which itself exists 
unspoiled by the individual viewpoints of historians.  In his own work, his appeal is 
neither to logical reasoning nor philosophical argumentation, but to the evidence he finds 
from those writers.  His own argument is declarative: writing history is a certain way, 
which can be demonstrated from evidence.  He continues to argue for history written on 
the basis of discovered facts, implying a discovery of some truth on his own part, which 
leads to a pluralistic conclusion.  White turns to an explicit advocacy for pluralism based 
on his own process:  
It may not go unnoticed that his book is itself cast in an Ironic mode.  But the 
Irony which informs it is a conscious one, and it therefore represents a turning of 
the Ironic consciousness against Irony itself.  If it succeeds in establishing that the 
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skepticism and pessimism of so much of contemporary historical thinking have 
their origins in an Ironic frame of mind, and that this frame of mind in turn is 
merely one of a number of possible postures that one may assume before the 
historical record, it will have provided some of the grounds for a rejection of 
Irony itself.  And the way will have been partially cleared for the reconstitution of 
history as a form of intellectual activity which is at once poetic, scientific, and 
philosophical in its concerns—as it was during history’s golden age in the 
nineteenth century.91 
 
 The exact nature of the reconstitution that White references does not receive much 
attention in Metahistory.  At the very end of the book, White argues that Irony has 
become dominant as the necessary perspective for historians in the twentieth-century, 
which contains an “inherent skepticism, which passes for scholarly caution and 
empiricism,” as well as “moral agnosticism, which passes for objectivity and 
transideological neutrality.”92  But the reconstitution of history that White hopes for 
offers no particular solution.  He only wishes to see other perspectives to be viewed as 
useful, to not be dominated by Irony: “Historians and philosophers of history will then be 
freed to conceptualize history, to perceive its contents, and to construct narrative accounts 
of its processes in whatever modality of consciousness is most consistent with their own 
moral and aesthetic aspirations.”93  His proposed solution is therefore pluralist and 
Skeptical.  The freedom offered by the pluralist approach is, of course, much as with the 
interpretations of War and Peace presented, the freedom to generate conflict.  Without a 
particular solution, a catch-all approach to writing and thinking about history that can 
encompass all viewpoints without conflict, there is a guarantee of conflict.  As much as 
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White’s assertions lead in the direction of a values-based academic endeavor in the 
historical discipline, they fall short of that conclusion.  White instead reiterates pluralistic 
arguments and truths as is now common for historians, at least in part to be evaluated 
based on the factual aspect of any given historical writing.  The solution offered by White 
is a freedom from a dominant method through imagination.  But the solution of freedom 
from dominance can only guarantee a finite degree of freedom if it chains us to inevitable 
conflict.  White encourages no universal approach for history writing, nor does he 
advocate the use of history for political action toward a universal end for humanity. 
Examples of Historical Writing in Recognition of the Particular-Universal Tension 
 Much like the majority of philosophers of history, most historians are 
particularists with regards to writing historical works.  Historians overwhelmingly tend to 
write according to the particular facts and sources they are concerned with, concede their 
limitations as individual researchers and writers attempting to assert historical truth, and 
recognize the plurality of possible narratives as true if the facts and sources may support 
multiple narratives.  Historians largely do so only in the background of their monographs, 
their philosophical approach given either light recognition or none at all.  Simon 
Schama’s 1995 book, Landscape and Memory provides an excellent example.  In the 
seventeen page introduction to his work about the relationship between human history 
and nature, Schama writes two comments in passing.  The first concerns universality; 
with regards to nature myths, Schama mentions the views of psychologist Carl Jung and 
anthropologist Mircea Eliade, who both make generalities about the human species in 
relation to nature myths.  Schama states in some contradiction with those scholars that 
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“My own view is necessarily more historical, and by that token much less confidently 
universal.”94  Schama assumes the particularism of history without discussion.   
At another point, he writes concerning the use of his book as a tool for 
environmental politics: “Like all histories, this is less a recipe for action than an 
invitation to reflection, and is meant as a contribution to self-knowledge rather than a 
strategy for ecological rescue.”95  The casual assertions Schama makes are of a particular, 
passive history, much reminiscent of R.G. Collingwood, whose work Schama is no doubt 
acquainted with.  Schama neither broaches the topic of history writing’s flaws as 
dominated by particularism, nor posits the use of history for any political action, let alone 
the triumph of a universal humanity.  There are, however, a few historians who are quite 
aware of the philosophical approach they take when writing an historical monograph.  
The particular-universal tension is examined in one form or another, and a solution to that 
tension is put forward.  The mode of political expression in self-aware histories generally 
remains quite passive, encouraging little in the way of direct action, but some 
methodological philosophy is still utilized.  Stephen Bednarski’s A Poisoned Past: The 
Life and Times of Margarida de Portu, a Fourteenth-Century Accused Poisoner, and Yair 
Mintzker’s The Many Deaths of Jew Süss: The Notorious Trial and Execution of an 
Eighteenth-Century Court Jew, are two such examples. 
Stephen Bednarski writes his 2014 work, A Poisoned Past, in the mode of a 
particular genre of history: microhistory.  The entire first chapter of A Poisoned Past is 
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devoted to defining microhistory, and placing it in the historiographical context of 
historical methodology.  According to Bednarski, microhistory “takes a single, focused, 
historical “moment” and uses it to shine light on a broader world.”96  Microhistory was 
formulated in the 1970s and 80s as a reaction to the Annales School of history, which 
advocated a “large-scale, quantitative, and statistical form of history,” and was popular in 
the mid-twentieth century.97  The Annales School “focused on total or complete history 
(histoire totale), took a big picture, long-term (longue-durée) approach to the past, and 
saw large structures and enduring processes.”98  Microhistory, then, advocates for the 
particular in history, and does so in order to avoid making assertions about history that 
are so general as to miss nuances.  It is the epitome of particularist history, so much so 
that it not only avoids making general statements about history, but finds such 
universalist sentiments to actively repress elements of history and to be error in the 
historical enterprise.  Microhistorians, like many contemporary historians, is focused on 
the “lived experience of the majority of the human population,” of which the 
macrohistorical approach utilized by the Annales School is little to no assistance.99   
Bednarski’s book provides an exceptional example of particularism in history.  
His methodological approach relies on microhistory, and he thus studied a single 
“moment” (Margarida de Portu’s trial) by using a relatively small number of documents, 
and focuses on a “little person” in history, who had no importance in the grand political 
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narratives of the past favored by Ranke and his followers.  But even aside from 
Bednarski’s methodological research approach, and the first chapter dedicated to 
explaining that approach, he affirms the particularity of his historical narrative in another 
way.  Through his book, he interrupts his own historical writing to explain why he writes 
what he does.  He breaks down the sources he uses, how he analyzed them, and includes 
possibilities for how the sources could have been read in such a way to create a different 
history that would be no less valid.  For example, from pages sixty-six to seventy-five, 
Bednarski explains the context of legal documents in medieval Europe, how they were 
recorded, how legal historians analyze them, and how he himself analyzed them.  In 
particular, Bednarski notes that in the context of legal documents, microhistorians have 
been criticized in the past for analyzing too few documents, per the general approach of 
the microhistorical school.  He explains how he addresses that criticism:  
To determine the significance of the trials pertaining to Margarida and the death 
of Johan [Margarida’s husband], I have cast them against a systematic study of 
1,644 other cases preserved from the court of Manosque between 1340 and 1405.  
I tracked these cases using a computer database, reducing each one to its 
constituent elements.  I tracked individuals as accused persons, denouncers, 
witnesses, plaintiffs, or defendants, and noted their place of origin, current 
citizenship, sex, and marital status, as well as their craft, trade, or profession.  
Finally, I tracked specific charges, verdicts, and sentences.  In addition to the 
database, I transcribed 873 typed pages of trial records.  This material provides 
the filter through which I read Margarida’s trials and informs my conclusions.  It 
also provides me with wider familiarity about the characters who populate her 
tale.100 
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As Bednarski puts it, A Poisoned Past works “not . . . to remove the author.  Rather, it 
lays bare the working method of the historian and highlights weaknesses, flaws, and 
dangers.  The aim is twofold: first, to present the reader with a good historical yarn from 
which to learn; and second, to show how and why historians attempt to do history.”101 
 Bednarski’s effort in A Poisoned Past is, no doubt, in extremely good faith.  
There seems to be an honest attempt to write for a general audience, to educate as many 
readers as approach the book, to be honest about the methods and analytical styles used to 
write the novel, and to explain what historical writing is.  Bednarski embraces the work 
written by Collingwood, Carr, and White, and recognizes the limitations of historical 
narrative as particular and restricted, barred from the universal.  And while Bednarski 
does embrace the pluralism and particularism of narrative as explained by those 
philosophers of history, he does not fall into the trap of a simplistic relativism.  He states, 
concerning the main character of his narrative, Margarite de Portu, that “There is much I 
do not know about this long-dead woman.  But there is much of her I do know, or at least 
think I can know.”102  Bednarski recognizes his own limitations, and openly portrays 
them in his own narrative, but nevertheless asserts his authority as a historian over 
knowledge, at least in a qualified form.  Here again we see the equality of pessimism as 
espoused by Berlin and others: even the individual who has devoted more research than 
any other than possibly a handful of other people on the planet to a particular subject 
must deny any certainty of their knowledge.  Bednarski is likely alone with regards to his 
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research effort on Margarita de Portu, but still writes as though all his conclusions must 
be qualified.  While there is an admirable thoroughness to his thought, and he does not 
exclude himself from conditioned knowledge, his philosophical approach nevertheless 
begs the question of why anyone would continue to write history.  As Bednarski is clear 
to say, different histories may always be written about the same subject, whether they 
differ in philosophical approach, research method, or the “modern interests and 
priorities” always at play in the construction of an historical writing.103  How, then, might 
those particular elements be overcome? 
 Yair Mintzker proposes to answer the question of particularism with what he 
refers to as “polyphonic history.”  Mintzker reconstructs the historical events he is 
concerned with—the trial and execution of Joseph Süss Oppenheimer in the early 
eighteenth-century—by utilizing four different perspectives found in the historical 
documents tied to the event.  Those perspectives shape the outline of his book; each 
perspective, and Mintzker’s analysis of each perspective, provides a full chapter on its 
own.  He uses the perspectives of persons relevant to the case but with differing views, 
whose accounts are often contradictory and untrustworthy.  While such a variety of 
sources is not unusual in history, depending on the relevant event, the accounts 
concerning Oppenheimer are particularly opposed to each other.  Mintzker’s solution is 
to take the conflicting accounts—those of the judge-inquisitor for Oppenheimer’s case, 
the testament of some of Oppenheimer’s last visitors before his execution, the only 
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contemporary Jewish account of Oppenheimer’s life and death, and one of the earliest 
biographers of Oppenheimer—and analyze each in its own right, only indirectly learning 
anything about Oppenheimer himself.  But aside from the analysis of the accounts 
themselves, Mintzker uses a much more interesting method in his book to address the 
issue of a multiplicity of views.  He introduces what he refers to as “conversations” 
between each chapter in order to address the view of the reader in his book.  In his own 
words: 
It [polyphonic history] is also manifest in my decision to include short dialogues 
between me and an imaginary reader after each chapter.  It is highly unusual for 
this device to be used by a professional historian, and my employment of it is sure 
to cause some controversy.  I use it, however, for a reason.  Over the past several 
years, while presenting different parts of this book in the United States, Europe, 
and Israel, I was simultaneously fascinated and taken aback by my colleagues’ 
reactions to my polyphonic methodology.  The author-reader dialogues in the 
book are by no means an attempt to tell future readers of this book what to think.  
Rather, they are my way of both of responding to some obvious objections to my 
methodology and of acknowledging their validity.104 
 
 As Mintzker says, the conversations he writes between chapters are unusual.  
They are written in the format of dialogue, broken up into paragraphs stated by the 
Author and the Reader.  Mintzker does not hesitate to use the first-person, nor does he 
shy away from making the Reader immensely perceptive and self-aware in order to 
emulate the critiques Mintzker has received from early drafts of his book.  The Author in 
turns agrees and disagrees with the Reader, argues particular points, and both treats the 
Reader with respect and demands authority as the historical researcher.  In a simplistic 
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sense, as Mintzker describes the conversations, they are a way to shake up typical 
historical prose and create a more interesting work for a reader to engage with.  
Throughout the monograph, Mintzker makes a number of literary references, particularly 
Biblical ones, to which he draws attention through the dialogues, as he points out in the 
Third Conversation: “I also use the fictive nature of a dialogue with an imaginary reader 
to acknowledge and indeed draw attention to the literary elements in my own account.”105  
In the Afterword, Mintzker gives more context to the narratological variations he tries to 
include in a historical work.  His dissatisfaction is both aesthetic and logical.  
Aesthetically, most history writing still emulates the style of early-nineteenth century 
novelists, an area in which our evolution Mintzker finds to be inadequate considering the 
amount of literary changes to narrative structure that have taken place in the two 
centuries since.  Logically, and more importantly, we are reluctant to put to writing the 
ways in which our opinions change, the ways in which we do not understand a concept or 
piece of evidence, the way in which our finished works have a single voice rather than 
the tangled woof of truth that would be a more honest depiction of our process.  
Polyphonic history is meant to address those problems and ride the line between “the 
Scylla of false omniscience and the Charybdis of ‘post-truth’ relativism”, in which there 
lies “a whole world of possibilities.”106  Much like Bednarkski’s work in microhistory, 
Mintzker desires to humble the historian as a limited individual while asserting the 
possibility of a qualified knowledge about the past.  But in Mintzker’s case, rather than 
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focusing on the particular so much as to prioritize it and eschew generalizations about 
humanity, he wishes to include multiple voices and perspectives into a single work.  
Mintzker’s goal is to offer a multi-faceted view of Oppenheimer: “we are about to see 
Oppenheimer portrayed from different angles: from up close and far away; in public, in 
the interrogation room, and in prison; in a legal, social, and theological light; and in 
Christian and Jewish terms.”107  Without using multiple, highly contradictory sources, 
such a multi-faceted view would be impossible. 
 In a more complicated sense than Mintzker places it, his work attempts to 
overcome the particularity of perspective and narrative by featuring multiple perspectives 
and narratives.  If knowledge cannot be a simple assertion by an individual, then a 
narrative in which multiple individual perspectives are explicitly incorporated, 
highlighting their differences, is Mintzker’s answer.  Mintzker is, certainly, on an 
interesting track.  But polyphonic history, for all its interesting qualities, still falls short of 
overcoming the particular-universal tension.  It may be narratologically refreshing in a 
field growing stale in its prose, but it still posits no truth.  The best it can offer is a 
narrative with more explicit incorporation of differing perspectives, in both Mintzker’s 
sources and the conversations, but of course the range of perspectives in The Many 
Deaths of Jew Süss is severely limited.  The differing accounts of Oppenheimer must still 
be reconstructed by Mintzker’s modern mindset.  Mintzker featured the criticisms and 
praise he received during his writing process, but he can only hear, and more importantly 
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respect, so many voices.  He is still the central element of the multi-vocal structure he 
builds.  He listened to other academics and specialists, other people that he respects, 
loves, and dislikes.  Everything said to him concerning his book was filtered through his 
own understanding and perspective, and what he chose to present in the conversations 
and how he presented them are inevitably shaped by him.  In truth, the conversations in 
The Many Deaths of Jew Süss are Mintzker talking to himself; the guise of the Other as 
an object of correspondence is a guise of Mintzker’s own creation.  The conversations are 
largely a rhetorical strategy of persuasion rather than a revolutionary tool to change the 
methods of historians.  By assuring the reader that other voices are present in Mintzker’s 
own writing, the reader is supposed to be persuaded that a different type of history is 
being written.  The conversations also serve as a way for Mintzker to be artistically 
indulgent while writing a professional history; in the fourth conversation, regarding The 
Story of the Passing of Joseph Süss, one of the four accounts of Oppenheimer and his 
trial, Mintzker uses the Reader to more liberally interpret The Story than would perhaps 
be generally accepted by other historians.  Mintzker himself wondered if The Story was 
written along the line’s of Oppenheimer’s supposed request than people would view him 
as forgiven by God and read study the Torah after his death, an interpretation that must 
be read into the source itself and not featured in the chapter about The Story.  In the 
fourth conversation, the Reader presents suspicion that Mintzker believes The Story to 
have been written sympathetically, and Mintzker, in faux delight, explores that 
possibility.  As the Reader notes: “Surely, then, a book that holds these aspirations [to 
sympathize with Oppenheimer in the way Mintzker believes The Story to do] cannot be 
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considered a work of professional history?”108  The conversations are thus, as rhetorical 
and narratological tools, self-serving for Mintzker, and unable to overcome the particular 
at all.  Mintzker’s approach only further illuminates the restrictions narrative and 
particular perspective place on our knowledge and expression. 
 Historians and philosophers of history have engaged with problem of asserting 
knowledge about the past.  They have been conscious that there is some problem with the 
declarations of the particular about the universal, and have had different solutions to this 
problem.  None, however, even those which seem as radical as Hayden White’s or as 
narratologically unusual as Yair Mintzker’s, can overcome the particular.  Each, with the 
exception of theistic solutions like Leopold von Ranke’s, concludes that history is in the 
end a particularist endeavor, and that there can be no alternative method which is able to 
overcome the particular-universal tension.  And those historians would still refuse to say 
that history is an empty effort.  They affirm the particular by continuing to write history 
for the particular, for various reasons.  But none of those reasons is given as explicitly 
political; no action is urged by those historians.  Philosophically wary historians see most 
of the views presented in this chapter as radical and destructive to the historical 
discipline.  But instead the opposite is true; the views presented here (aside from 
Ranke’s) only affirm the empirical pluralism already predominant in the historical 
discipline.  None of them posit complete relativism and moral emptiness, and none of 
them posit a solution which can overcome all particular ignorance and bring about a 
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complete universalism for humanity, an ascendance to certain truth.  The philosophical 
urgings of the historians who have contemplated the particular-universal tension are 
overwhelmingly passive.  They do not urge action, they do not urge putting the past to 
use in creating a better future.  They either try and redeem the suffering of past humanity 
with lessons to make us feel better in the present, or lament the suffering of the past for 
its own sake.  The first is small in scope and content with the general status quo of our 
existence, and the second is sickeningly passive, content to have knowledge of 
humanity’s existential state of suffering as informed by the past without trying to do 
anything about it, or even urge the rest of our species that our suffering is good.  Writing 













A NEW HISTORY 
 The polemic raised in War and Peace against historians consists of an attack on 
human agency, a non-teleological history, and the validity of narrative as a way to gain 
knowledge about the past.  Tolstoy also minces no words when accusing historians of 
being elitist and engaged in history largely for the sake of self-interest; in Marxist terms, 
bourgeois.  Although we have determined that Tolstoy’s attacks on agency and non-
teleological history are useless given the exercise we undertake in analyzing them, his 
other critiques still stand with some substance.  Tolstoy accuses historians of taking what 
Jeff Love characterizes as the core of Tolstoy’s pessimistic determinism, our inability to 
comprehend the universal because of our particular finitude, and desecrating that essence 
of our being with efforts to benefit ourselves as individuals.  In the words of Jeff Love in 
his chapter on Tolstoy and peace in Tolstoy on War: “the most radical aspect” of 
Tolstoy’s polemic against history is “the elimination of narratives directed by particular 
views that have no ground other than a kind of collective self-interest.”109 Rather than 
giving in to the natural laws that govern us, and living in accordance with them, 
historians write narratives claiming knowledge about the past, which posit human agency 
and influence on the course of history, anathema to Tolstoy’s universal determinist 
history due to the attachment to particular, individual self-interest.  And while Tolstoy 
critiqued history as it was performed 150 years ago, the historical discipline has changed 
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little since.  Historians still posit human freedom in their histories, write narratives about 
the past with vested self-interest, maintain a bourgeois status, but all the same avoid a 
universal truth.  And while historians tend to emphasize overarching political narratives 
and warfare less than they did in the 1860s and are more amenable to limited plurality, 
these are frankly cosmetic differences rather than substantive ones.  Historians now differ 
little from the historians Tolstoy attacked in War and Peace. 
It is unfortunately difficult to counter some of Tolstoy’s claims, although the 
academics who received Tolstoy have most often ignored his arguments concerning the 
philosophy of history and the universal.  Historians are, as is academia generally, 
bourgeois.  The histories we write are rarely for a general audience.  They are far more 
often for the sake of intra-disciplinary dialogue.  They are written using sources most 
often inaccessible to someone not affiliated with a university.  Most importantly, the 
histories we tend to write are particular and passive.  No one writes history and frames it 
as part of a certain truth; we instead write from our perspective, recognize that historical 
narratives are always limited and shaped by their authors, and leave it at that.  Tolstoy’s 
characterization of historians as forgers, concerned with knowledge which has nothing to 
do with a central truth, maintains its relevancy today.  Historians encourage no action to 
change the particularity of our species, nor do we seek a future universalism.  Ranke, 
Collingwood, Carr, and White encouraged no action, and historians today are little 
different.  Historians are concerned with the past and the present, and leave action and the 
future for others.  We have embraced our particularity, we maintain our bourgeois status, 
and as such have fallen into a pessimism even darker than Tolstoy’s.  Tolstoy thought 
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submission to natural law, as a universal power, would keep humanity from the conflicts 
inherent in the particular.  We instead have given in to the pessimism of inevitable 
ignorance and self-interest, and thus conflict. 
 But in the course of this work, we have decided that Tolstoy’s attack on our 
freedom and ability to shape history as it unfolds is unworthy of the rest of his argument.  
Tolstoy’s conclusion would pre-empt writing that conclusion out, arguing for it so 
passionately to persuade others, and even the exercise Tolstoy undertook to reach that 
conclusion.  How could we take his advice seriously, when to consider whether it is 
worth taking seriously assumes some impact in the world on our behalf as a result of our 
judgment, an implicit example of agency?  The answer he gives, submission to natural 
law, resignation to our suffering as inevitable, abandonment of any hope to influence our 
existence of our own will, is inherently pessimistic.  Such pessimism and denial of our 
agency insults the human.  We have instead decided that we are able to choose how we 
shape our future.  If we wish, we may even choose to overcome our particularity and 
embrace universalism in the fullest way possible.  History, and historians, may serve to 
bring about the future, should we choose to attempt it.  To do so, historians must engage 
in an atheistic enterprise, where human freedom is unbounded and we choose to shape a 
future in which there is nothing which may dominate us.  We must refuse the gods of our 
past and present, however they may manifest.  We must refuse time, suffering, and death 
any hold over our existence as a species.  Historians must embark on a truly universal 
project, in which every member of our species is sublimated to a single entity, and 
humanity achieves absolute mastery of the universe.  The efforts of science and 
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technological advancement will be the chief mechanisms to reach a universal end, human 
ingenuity and tenacity their engines.  But there is also a place for art in our effort, in 
which history and historians may become of significant assistance.  Historians mourn the 
past because we are aware of the fullness of its suffering.  We, better than any others, are 
aware of what humanity has undergone in our search for truth and knowledge.  Our 
memories are full of the suffering we’ve witnessed from a distance, and we still do not 
know all that suffering.  If a true universalism is to be brought about, then historians must 
engage every member of our species to that end.  We must all make the decision for 
ourselves that our particular individuality is worth giving up in order for humanity to 
ascend beyond the gods which govern us, to overcome the limitations which generate the 
crosses we bear and the sins we commit.  Historians may serve as proselytizers for a 
universal future by presenting exactly what it is that we are attempting to overcome, and 
persuading others to do the same.  We may become the heralds of an atheistic religion, 
and cross all false boundaries between the members of our species in order to bring about 
a universal humanity. 
 It is no small thing, of course, to propose the restructuring of an entire academic 
discipline, let alone the development and dissemination of a new religion.  We must 
ensure that we have a firm grasp of the logical grounds to do so in the first place.  The 
philosophical quandary many historians and philosophers of history have been fixated on 
is whether or not a single, true narrative of history exists and can be told by historians.  
The vast majority of historians in the last century, especially since the Second World 
War, have felt convinced that if such a narrative exists at all, it is undiscoverable by we 
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historians, and thus historical narratives may all be respected according to the quality of 
their evidence from historical sources.  It is a pluralistic position which allows for a 
certain degree of passivism on behalf of historians who wish to maintain history as a 
neutral profession, without particular inclinations which may be construed as political.  
While this is not a perfect description of all current professional historians, of course, it is 
still broad enough to cover the vast majority of their approaches to history.  Some 
historians are more inclined to characterize historical narratives as value-driven in their 
creation, and some historians are more inclined to value the use of evidence in historical 
sources, but few if any are willing to completely disregard either element.  What they all 
have in common is a sense of passivism; history is not for any particular line of action, 
but only for its own discovery. 
 But we are not interested in a pluralistic philosophy of history.  We are interested 
in a philosophy of history that will end conflict and violence, and the only way to do so is 
to assist in the creation of universal world order in which individual identity is sublimated 
to the greater entity of humanity.  Tolstoy is quite thorough in his depiction of self-
interest in the War and Peace: self-expression and desire are harmful and lead to conflict.  
But we wish not for a humanity that subjugates itself to greater powers, as does Tolstoy, 
but rather a humanity which ascends above any power through the self-sacrifice of 
individuals to the good of the species.  We therefore necessitate a philosophy of history 
which assumes the existence of our agency and freedom to influence history as humans, 
and also rejects a pluralism which will keep our species artificially divided.  The only 
philosophy of history which may satisfy both those requirements is a political 
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philosophy.  We assume the active engagement of historians in shaping our world from 
particular to universal, and to do so we must be willing to treat the past as a tool with 
which to actively create the future.  Most historians refuse to see history as political.  
They instead favor a passive neutrality, in which the knowledge brought by history may 
be put to political means, but where history itself is constructed in a plurality of valid 
ways, none of which may be dominant.  But there is still a dominance in the current 
history: dominance of the particular, which in turn leads to the dominance of self-interest 
and thus conflict. 
 Our logical foundation is strong.  If we truly wish to end violence and conflict, we 
must attain the universal, and to do that we must put history to use and unify its writing 
under a single political narrative which affirms our own ability to change our future.  But 
current historians fear the predominance of one historical approach, especially one which 
encourages action, out of fear of domination.  In fairness, dominant, singular historical 
narratives that have been pushed in the past, especially in the twentieth-century, have 
been the tools of totalitarian states with violent ideologies, and have led to the deaths of 
tens of millions.  Fear of a dominant political and historical narrative is certainly justified.  
Our history, therefore, must resist the simplistic temptation of dominance through 
violence from the outset.  We must establish ourselves as not only aimed toward 
universal peace as our eventual end, but also during our journey to that end.  Our tool to 
spread the message of universality must be one of logical and values-based persuasion, 
not coercion or the elimination of rivals.  If we are to embrace history as constructed, 
based on the analysis of Hayden White, then we should be willing to be morally 
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conscious about the nature of our construction.  If our cause should be for the betterment 
of our species, then the approach we take and the methods we use should encourage that 
betterment intrinsically.  Our task is one of love; self-sacrificial, transformative, all-
embracing love.  To fall into a cliché, Machiavellian, means-justifies-ends trope would be 
inexcusable.  If the new history were to do so, it would already be a lost cause, distanced 
from the goals we set out here and hypocritical to its stated purpose. 
 If we do not allow the new history to engage with humanity in terms of violence 
and coercion, and instead insist that it be a political movement of intrinsic peace, we risk 
becoming passive rather than pacifist.  Change, especially the radical types of change 
proposed here, always brings with it an internal violence, at the very least.  If we are to 
bring our species to the common task of attaining a universal state, we will have to 
change the minds of all individuals.  To undergo a worldview change of that degree, from 
self-interest and pessimism to the optimism of unified humanity, is a violation of all 
previously held thought.  This type of violence cannot be helped, and we should not be 
wary of it.  It is violence every human must experience in order to engage in the political 
endeavor preached by the new history.  To continue the analogy with religion, we must 
encourage the internal violence of conversion.  Here is one of the most important points 
at which the new history diverges from Tolstoy; Tolstoy would have absolute peace 
through submission and passivity.  There can be no violence due to action through 
conversion if humanity is surrendered to natural law.  But in the new history, in a 
similarly pacifistic stance as Tolstoy, there can be no coercion to bring about the radical 
change inside all the hearts of humanity we desire.  History avails us of all the suffering 
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had on account of forced conversion.  We know better than anyone the perils of religious 
persuasion, whether they be the horrors inflicted on native peoples in conquered lands or 
the faux righteousness of the Crusades.  If we want to encourage internal change in 
humans without coercion or violence, then the new history must have tools fit for the 
purpose. 
 To be in line with the motivations of the new history, a logical imperative which 
necessitates the universal for the sake of peace in tandem with a moral desire to end 
suffering and conflict, the new history should engage on those levels: reason and 
morality.  Logical persuasion and public engagement are the necessary tools of the new 
history.  If we do not open ourselves to the broader public, then our works will be unable 
to get the traction needed to persuade anyone of the importance of the universal.  In a 
somewhat similar sense to Bednarski’s work, our reasoning and motivation should be 
bared.  At every turn, the reconstructions of history we write should be clear in their 
reasoning and purpose.  And in a somewhat similar sense as Mintzker’s work, we should 
be willing to engage directly with others in our reconstructions in order to demonstrate 
the value of collective inclusion and effort.  The base appealed to for feedback should be 
far broader, but the work would nevertheless be a similar effort to Mintzker’s.  If our 
persuasion is open, honest, and morally driven, then our work should have no room for 
factual concealment or elitism.   
A politically driven and engaged history would immediately come under criticism 
for being biased, dishonest as an institution of knowledge, and encouraging to relativism.  
The new history is capable of circumventing those criticisms.  We have already embraced 
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bias; we recognize that all histories are constructed and that facts are only so valuable in 
the historical discipline.  The weakness of historical narratives, in part illustrated by 
Tolstoy in War and Peace, thus far has been the way historians continue to posit biased 
narratives as true based on the factual appeal, to cast histories as discovered truth rather 
than constructed truth.  Instead of embracing a plurality of already constructed and 
therefore “biased” narratives or refusing to concede the degree of their construction, the 
new history demonstrates the willingness to embrace construction as an element of 
human freedom.  By doing so, new historians may respond to the criticism of their open 
bias by engaging in a values-based dialogue.  If all historical narratives are already 
constructed and therefore “biased,” then what bias is bespoken in their narrative?  If the 
new historian is biased with a desire to bring peace through nonviolence and a universal 
state, and is opposed to a critic who is biased with a desire for conflict and self-interest, 
then the dialogue is in some sense already resolved.  The Holocaust-denier who will 
endlessly argue the Holocaust never happened, if questioned correctly, will eventually 
reveal a dislike for Jews and most likely other minorities.  At the point of that revelation, 
nothing further needs to be done on behalf of the new historian; the narrative proposed is 
one of hatred and conflict, and is therefore not worth consideration.  Rather than 
questioning a bigot’s historical method and throwing up endless facts that will fall on 
deaf ears, directly addressing the deficit of values at hand will go much further to deal 
with the problem.  The dialogue about bias may be shifted from an issue of whether or 




There will be some critics who would judge a values-based history lacking in 
some sense of intellectual integrity; if history is values-based, then it becomes little more 
than moral conjecture, without basis in reality, and thus cannot be regarded as a rigorous 
institution of reason and knowledge.  This problem again coincides with the issue of 
knowledge as discovered versus knowledge as constructed.  As we have established with 
previous historians and philosophers of history, historical writings are reconstructed 
narratives, incapable of describing the past without involving the present.  Writing history 
by using documents and reconstructed events of the past for the sake of a future purpose, 
as the new history seeks to do, in fact differs from the current method of writing history 
only in the reason for its writing.  History is currently written for the sake of presentist 
concerns about current debates within the discipline, ensuring tenure, and other various 
forms of self-interest, which Tolstoy illustrated a century and a half ago.  Harnessing the 
reasons for writing history and uniting all historians’ reasonings under a single purpose 
does not demonstrate a lack of integrity as a discipline.  Rather, it demonstrates an 
agreement on the overarching purpose of writing history at all, lending the new history 
greater integrity by recognizing both the reality of its method and the greater role for our 
species that it may serve.  To presume a history unified for the purpose of political action 
lacks the integrity of a divided history, without greater purpose and used to enforce 
current societal structures, implies a misunderstanding of how historians write history. 
The greatest potential criticism of the new history is of its perceived relativism.  If 
historical knowledge is to be created based on values rather than independently existing-
facts, the critic would ask, what stops anyone from declaring history to be any particular 
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way they like, regardless of any historical evidence?  Would history not become a 
battleground for different values-systems to embroil themselves in, reminiscent of a 
Schmittian appreciation for war, in which conflict is affirmed as the norm?  But this 
criticism, too, may be answered.  To be for a values-based history, and against an 
empirical history, is not to reject historical evidence.  Rather, it is to displace historical 
evidence as the pinnacle tool of history writing.  If the new history is to concern itself 
with the future and therefore action, then it must regard its own dialogue of values as its 
primary impetus.  Historical evidence is not to be ignored, only regarded as that which it 
is: another tool for writing history.  It is certainly an important tool, but far from the most 
important.  Narratives and facts, as constructed elements, do not rely solely on evidence, 
and the new history embraces the act of construction as an expression of human freedom 
and will.  To claim evidence as king in historical writing, the empiricist position, is to 
ignore the primacy of human reconstruction, the unshakeable element which drives all 
historical writing, even with presentist, particularist philosophies.  There is no universal 
truth to be found in evidence, only data points with which to build a greater truth.   
The new historian, therefore, still relies on historical evidence to construct 
historical writings, but does so in order to write compelling narratives persuading others 
of the importance of attaining a universal state of being.  Facts are not raised up as though 
to exist without the human; evidence is instead used to construct facts for the sake of the 
universal end.  By recognizing the significance of values in the writing of history and 
dethroning empiricism from its elitist, bourgeois seat, new historians are forced to 
recognize all historical narratives.  There is no longer a simple way for a new historian to 
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dismiss a proposed narrative wholesale because it uses the wrong evidence, no evidence, 
or comes from someone without a graduate degree.  New historians will therefore have 
many more narratives to deal with, far outside the realm of academia.  All historical 
narratives, regardless of their source should be sublimated to a universal narrative 
regarding humanity’s past of suffering and potential future born of action.  But rather 
than descending into a defeatist sense of relativism in the face of overwhelming numbers 
of historical narratives, new historians are instead motivated to persuade others of the 
importance of the universal; the new history is entirely bound up with bringing humanity 
to a singular point of victory.  It therefore brooks no relativism, and is willing to continue 
working to persuade others of the importance of the future, the truth, of which new 
historians will aid in the construction.  It is with regards to the relevance of persuasion for 
the sake of action that the new historian’s critique of history differs with Tolstoy; Tolstoy 
paradoxically hoped to persuade us to act as though our actions have no meaning, while 
the new historian acts in full belief of their own power to change the future. 
It may be noted by those with some acquaintance with philosophy that the project 
outlined here is quite reminiscent of history as described by Georg Wilhelm Friedrich 
Hegel.  Hegel is famous for framing history as “dialectical,” that is, recursively 
progressive to an end goal based on the evolutions of human societies.  The end Hegel 
foresees is complete human self-realization, which takes the form of Reason manifesting 
itself through humans in the shape of a universal, ethical community.  Reason, according 
to Hegel, is the spirit of humanity, and manifests itself through us because Reason also 
underlies the functioning of the universe itself.  Hegel refers to Reason in that context as 
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the Idea, or Spirit.  It is our nature as humans to express the Idea by our own activity.  All 
humanity’s efforts should thus be guided to self-determinism, to the becoming-of-
ourselves-in-the-world.  Stephen Houlgate’s book, An Introduction to Hegel, offers an 
excellent analysis of history and truth in Hegel:  
Hegel is an ‘idealist’ (in his philosophy of history, at least) because he does not 
understand human character or identity to be some fixed, immutable ‘reality,’ but 
rather conceives of human beings as actively producing their character and 
identity in history . . . The goal of historical activity, for Hegel, is thus for human 
beings to become conscious of themselves as freely and historically self-
productive and self-determining—not something fixed by nature—and for them to 
build their world in accordance with that recognition . . . Becoming aware of the 
true character of human existence does not mean for him simply becoming 
conscious of a given, fixed reality or gaining a more accurate picture of what we 
were like at the beginning of history.  Rather, it means learning that we are in the 
process of producing and determining ourselves.110 
Hegel thus defies any pessimism about the nature of humanity.  The exact way our 
species expresses itself and becomes in the world is up to our own choices.  We are what 
we create ourselves to be, which is itself, as a result of our choices, our true form.  We 
are thus quite in line with Hegel with regards to our view of humanity and its future.  In a 
loose sense, we are also aligned with Hegel with regards to action; while Hegel does not 
offer up how a professional historical discipline might conduct itself to assist in 
humanity’s becoming in the fashion given here, to encourage human action for the sake 
of future betterment fits with his philosophy. 
 One of the senses in which there may be some divergence between the new 
history and Hegel is with regards to history as atheistic.  Interpretations of Hegel 
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concerning theism differ; there is a prominent leftist interpretation of Hegel as atheistic, 
in which Hegel encourages us to become without the use of a God, or at most with a God 
that is to be overthrown.  In this interpretation, humanity transforms itself and increases 
its knowledge of the universe so that it might achieve complete mastery of reality, 
fulfilling our nature as manifestations of Reason by effectively becoming gods through 
scientific and technological achievements.  There is also a rightist interpretation, in which 
the Spirit refers to the Christian God, and humans achieve the heights of their true natures 
through submission to that God, to the point of suicide.  In the lectures concerning his 
philosophy of history, compiled by Hegel’s students, he writes concerning God and the 
Spirit:  
It is this final goal—freedom—toward which all the world’s history has been 
working. It is this goal to which all the sacrifices have been brought upon the 
broad altar of the earth in the long flow of time. This is the one and only goal that 
accomplishes itself and fulfills itself—the only constant in the change of events 
and conditions, and the truly effective thing in them all. It is this goal that is 
God’s will for the world. But God is the absolutely perfect Being, and He can 
therefore will nothing but Himself, His own will. The nature of His will, 
however—i.e., His own nature, that is what we are here calling the Idea of 
freedom (since we are translating the religious image into philosophic thought).111 
The exact nature of Hegel’s relationship with God in the context of his philosophy of 
history has thus been the subject of much contention.  Stephen Houlgate’s position is that 
any such actual entity, a God rather than a metaphorical motivating force, is an invention 
of Hegel’s critics, rather than a dominant being towering over humanity.  Regardless of 
whether or not a God exists in Hegel’s framework, we have no need of such a thing.  We 
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may learn from Hegel how to articulate the role of human self-determination in our 
future, and we assume our ability to accomplish that self-determination without the 
assistance of a deity.  We assume that we may find freedom within our own universe and 
are capable of attaining that freedom by our own devices. 
 Aside from the issue of God, the new history may also diverge from Hegel in 
another way.  Again, depending on interpretation, Hegel may only refer to the ethical 
community and the rational sublimation of individuals to the collective when he refers to 
the fullness of humanity.  It is also possible that his rhetoric concerning choice is just 
that: humanity’s freedom as beings of Reason consists only in what we freely choose for 
ourselves.  But the new history advocates not just for human self-determination, but for 
humanity to have incredible influence on the structure of the universe as well.  The new 
history is thus not only part of the leftist tradition regarding universality and the 
overcoming of self-interest, but also within the leftist tradition of interpreting Hegel, 
largely established by Karl Marx.  Marx understood Hegel materially: humanity would 
reach for perfect universality and equality through material means, by the equal 
distribution of resources and technological development which will solve any 
conceivable problem regarding the production of goods.  And in fairness to Marx, the 
communist society fulfills the ideal of the ethical community.  But Marx views 
communism as a determined condition for humanity, a state it will inevitably reach in 
order to mediate between individuals.  The new history is neither deterministic (departing 
from both Tolstoy and Marx), and seeks a state of being for humanity beyond individuals, 
a philosophical consideration almost entirely absent from Marx’s work.  The new history 
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understands the individual as an impediment to freedom; where there exists individuality 
there exists difference, desire, and conflict.  Freedom is freedom from those things, in a 
similar way as freedom for Tolstoy is freedom from desire and conflict, but the new 
history goes further.  Freedom for the new historian is freedom from all dominant forces 
which separate humanity and subject it to suffering, and thus even freedom from the 
natural laws Tolstoy urges humanity to submit itself to in War and Peace. 
The freedom so keenly eyed by the new history will likely take a great deal of 
time and effort to create.  Its exact path of evolution is not planned; its progression is in 
the hands of those alive at each step.  But at all steps, new historians must provide 
themselves as the supporting element, reminders of the suffering which characterizes our 
species as individuals.  To provide that support, to be the keepers of the suffering in our 
past, is our key contribution to the universal state of being.  We can also, by 
implementing that action-oriented imperative needed to create our future, assist in 
creation by identifying those ideologies which would disrupt our progression to a 
universal state.  These of course include the obvious examples of racism, fascism, 
nationalism, and the like, but also include capitalism, liberalism, and even democracy.  
The former three are easy to identify as disruptive to the universal because they often are 
bound up with violence, and presuppose differences among humans based on group 
identities, quite obviously opposed to a universal state of being.  The latter three, 
however, need a little more nuance in explaining their opposition to a universal state of 
being.  They all may be considered universal in a simplistic sense, in that all humans may 
participate under a single civil state organized by those systems and still function.  There 
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could not be a single civil state framed by either fascism or nationalism, and racism 
assumes the existence of hatred for particular groups, subverting the possibility of 
universalism.   
Capitalism is the easiest of the latter three to identify as disruptive to the 
universal; it affirms self-interest, and leads to class division and inequality.  Liberalism is 
similar, though as a broader term is subject to more numerous definitions.  In the context 
of our approach to the particular-universal tension, we may understand liberalism as a 
philosophical acceptance of self-interest, but with enforced regulation to ensure peace.  
Liberalism seeks no radical change in the being of humanity, but rather seeks to adapt the 
human to a peaceful state of governance based on the equality of individuals.  It is thus 
opposed to bringing humanity to a universal state of being.  Democracy is similar: it 
asserts the equality of individuals and advocates decision-making as a collective effort of 
individuals, and thus does not function in the context of a truly collective manifestation 
of humanity.  This is not to say liberalism and democracy are not closer to universalism 
than fascism or nationalism, or that they lead to exactly the same types of violences and 
conflicts as fascism and nationalism.  They do, however, allow conflict to remain, and are 
generally oriented to some type of regulated capitalism.  They are unable to eradicate 
self-interest because they are founded on the human as a self-interested individual which 
must participate in society alongside other individuals.  They are limited because they 
presuppose the human to be individual and particular.  Liberalism and democracy should 
therefore be understood as temporary measures at most, stopgaps to prevent greater 
violence while we work toward better a better state of existence.  It may be assumed that 
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as advocates of self-sacrifice and a universal being for humanity, new historians should 
be focused on a Marxist political state, in which the individual is disregarded for the sake 
of communal good.  It is true that communism is the political system most closely 
connected to an ideal of the universal for humanity, and is thus in all likelihood a stage in 
the process toward universal humanity, but communism is not the final evolution to attain 
a true universal state.  The political arena itself must be dissolved by the time the end 
goal of the new history is realized, that arena only useful insofar as there are multiple 
individuals which must cooperate under the same governing structure.  Universal 
humanity, the end goal of the new history, does not entail the possibility for individuals, 
and thus politics will cease to have much meaning; there will be only decision, without 
debate or equivocation. 
By bringing humanity together into a single entity and dissolving all forms of 
individual pursuit, humanity can begin the process of ending its own particularity.  Our 
particularity, or finitude, is manifest in multiple ways.  The most obvious, and the 
particularity mostly referenced in this work, is the particularity of individual identities.  
Our species is separated into individuals, with their own respective thoughts, beliefs, 
backgrounds, and desires.  This separation causes conflict and violence when different 
individuals exert their desires on the world in different ways.  We compare, judge, and 
seek to subvert each other as part of our separation.  And certainly, overcoming our 
individuality is a massive step towards transforming humanity into a universality.  But 
universality for our species is more nuanced than just ending individual identity.  We are 
not only particular because we have different perspectives and desires; we are separated 
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by that which is most particular: death.  There has been no philosopher better acquainted 
with death than Martin Heidegger, at least in the West.  Heidegger refers to humanity as 
Dasein, which translates to Being-There or There-Being.  For Heidegger, death defines 
all aspects of human existence.  We exist in time as Beings-toward-death, with it always 
in front of us.  Death defines us as present.  A key passage from Heidegger’s best-known 
work, Being and Time, is worth reading in full here: 
Death is a possibility of being which Dasein itself has to take over in every case.  
With death, Dasein stands before itself in its ownmost potentiality-for-Being.  
This is a possibility in which the issue is nothing less than Dasein’s Being-in-the-
world.  Its death is the possibility of no-longer-being-able-to-be-there.  If Dasein 
stands before itself as this possibility, it has been fully assigned to its ownmost 
potentiality-for-Being.  When it stands before itself in this way, all its relations to 
any other Dasein have been undone.  This ownmost non-relational possibility is at 
the same time the uttermost one.   
As potentiality-for-Being, Dasein cannot outstrip the possibility of death.  Death 
is the possibility of the absolute impossibility of Dasein.  Thus death reveals itself 
as that possibility which is one’s ownmost, which is non-relational, and which is 
not to be outstripped [unüberholbare].  As such, death is something distinctively 
impending.  Its existential possibility is based on the fact that Dasein is essentially 
disclosed to itself, and disclosed, indeed, as ahead-of-itself.  This item in the 
structure of care has its most primordial concretion in Being-towards-death.  As a 
phenomenon, Being-towards-the-end becomes plainer as Being towards that 
distinctive possibility of Dasein which we have characterized.112 
In a sense unexplored by anyone in the same way before Heidegger, death is defined in 
philosophy as that which defines the human.  And as Heidegger points out in the 
italicized lines (emphasis Heidegger’s) death “reveals itself as that possibility which is 
one’s ownmost.”  Death functions as that which ends our possibilities for being, and it 
exists for all.  Every single human is a Being-towards-death, shaped by the approaching 
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end of our possibilities.  And the death of Dasein is completely individual; no two people 
have the exact same possibilities for Being, and thus the threatened elimination of those 
possibilities, up to the point of death, is unique for Dasein.  Heidegger demonstrates that 
we are particular not only because we are separate, but because we die as individuals.  
Heidegger thus shows us the most dominant theism of all: death itself as our god.  Death 
cannot be experienced because the moment it comes is the moment Dasein ends as an 
experiencing being.  Death dominates us all.  We are defined by, and exist in light of, our 
inevitable death.  Death shapes our species in every facet of our lives, because our lives 
exist in the context of their own ending, a result all Dasein are aware of.  Death makes us 
particular; we cannot be but finite if we cannot but cease to exist.  Heidegger urges us to 
accept Death as our god, though he calls himself atheist; for him, only the approach of 
Death, and the way we suffer in the face of it, allow us to be human.  We would not be 
Dasein if we were not Beings-toward-death. 
 If we truly wish to attain a universal state of being, it would seem as though we 
must overcome death itself.  Even were we to unite all individual humans into a single 
entity, if that entity could perish, it itself would only be one more particular among all 
other finite entities in the universe.  But how might death be overcome?  Death is not a 
thing which may be analyzed, nor is it a force which can be fought.  As Heidegger says, 
death is a possibility of impossibilities for being.  Death and the particular are intimately 
related, even beyond the context described in Being and Time.  As long as something 
may exist outside an entity, that entity is susceptible to the possibility of its own 
annihilation.  Without existing as an all-encompassing-state, in which there is no within 
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or without, only what is, completely and totally united, death, and thus particularity, 
persist.  A singular humanity, in which all individuals are subsumed, is still particular if 
there is that which it has not assimilated.  The universe is large; a completely united 
humanity remains vulnerable, particular, and deathful unless it itself attains the universal 
as a state of existence. 
 To unite humanity with the universe, and embed our will into every aspect of 
reality is the ultimate goal of the new historian’s universality.  We raise up human 
volition and self-determination, and place no limit our species’ right to assert itself in the 
world.  There should be no god over us, nothing outside us which may engage in a 
dominant role without our consent.  By some set of circumstances, the exact details of 
which are beyond our current knowledge, our species evolved, and did so with the ability 
to imagine the future, engage in creative pursuits, and reach the self-awareness of 
sentience.  We know ourselves as we are, and interact with the universe through our will.  
We have evolved to be thinking, reasoning creatures.  There is no determinism to do with 
our condition, as Tolstoy would have us believe.  We are simply as we find ourselves, 
and to reject our ability to will ourselves in reality is to reject the human.  Hegel had it 
right when he said that history is the story of our own becoming.  But as part of our 
ability to will, it is also possible to will ourselves into limitation, to place on our species 
some type of inescapable burden.  Christianity settled for our sinfulness, Tolstoy settled 
for our particularity, Heidegger settled for our deathfulness, to name but a few prominent 
examples.  To set a limit on our ability to will ourselves in reality is to declare a limit for 
our ability to better ourselves.  I cannot help but ask why we do this.  I cannot help but 
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imagine that there are things our species may do that are presently unimaginable, but still 
entirely within the realm of possibility.  I am not willing to concede that all the suffering 
we are caused by ourselves, each other, and the conditions of reality as they are currently 
set is inevitable, inescapable, or even, of all the possible adjectives, good.  To say that 
which leads to the suffering and pain of the human is good because of itself is to 
characterize all of history as the successful chronicle of human misery, and to set one’s 
self against the human as willful.  To call suffering and death good because of how they 
make us human is to condemn all those who follow us to the same fates as those who 
came before.  It is to accept war, genocide, disease, suicide, and misery as that which not 
only does presently exist, but as that which should exist.  What hubris!  What pride, what 
arrogance, what callousness, to say that the suffering of all our species, as long as we 
should persist, is good, when we ourselves can never experience the suffering of those we 
would condemn. 
To turn into suffering, to say that our deaths and trials in life are good, is not the 
supposed symbol of strength Tolstoy would have us believe.  It is instead weakness, 
surrender, a failure of imagination and will.  It is the cowardice of concession to that-as-
we-are rather than the bravery to create a new existence.  The concerns of the 
Heideggerians and others who advocate for human suffering are not of feasibility; such 
banal appeals to present practicality are weak, designed to blind us to the incredible 
progress our knowledge has gained in the last two and a half thousand years.  For what 
reason may practicality be a true barrier to human progress?  Such an assertion is a 
theism, a declaration of permanent, irreversible human limitation.  And, like every other 
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assertion about human nature, the theistic response is a narrative in which the narrator has 
a particular interest.  Those who encourage us to remain as we are, particular and 
deathful, fear to change our Being, our conditions as we exist in the universe.  They 
believe that to be human is to be finite and mortal.  Those parameters would indeed limit 
our species to particularity and death, and thus suffering.  But if we are willing to instead 
characterize the human as that which is willful, then we have already demonstrated the 
truth we are trying to create.  We are what we decide we are.  To make ourselves into 
what we decide we are, we will need to engage in mastery over the universe.  We thus 
challenge Tolstoy’s determinism regarding universal law in domination over the human, 
regarding the human as deterministically particular in face of the universal, and part from 
him irrevocably.  Tolstoy fears the Napoleon that causes destruction through action and 
will, while new historians subvert the threat of Napoleonic dominance through self-
sacrifice.  Action and change will occur for an ethical good, that is, the end of death and 
suffering and the attainment of universality, through love.  While Tolstoy may be 
credited with attempting to encourage a path toward peace, and refusing to hold up 
military exploits and its associated suffering as was popular in history, his solution is 
nevertheless one of subjugation.  Reaching our end will in all likelihood take an immense 
amount of time, and the process will be neither painless nor easy, but it nevertheless is a 
task that we must unite behind.  To become the universe, to transform from beings that 
will ourselves in reality to a single being that both wills and is the universe, is the greatest 
state of being, the highest singularity.  The end goal of the new history is one of singular 
atheism.  Not only do new historians seek to eradicate the mythical gods worshipped in 
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human history for the sake of reason, new historians seek to eradicate any dominant force 
over the human, including death.  The highest singularity is the ultimate becoming of the 
human as willful.  If there is any god in this universe, it will be humanity. 
But to attain the highest singularity, as previously illustrated, necessitates 
complete and total self-sacrifice.  All individual humans must cast our individual 
consciousnesses into a greater entity.  We thus cease to exist as individuals, but persist 
within a greater whole with which we are completely united, without division.  Thus may 
Death be subverted; functionally, death is the absolute end of possibilities for Dasein and 
exit from the world, whereas self-sacrifice as described here is the choice of a single 
possibility in the world without reserve.  Death is the annihilation of what is, while self-
sacrifice is the transformation of the extant.  We will of course lose all the charms of life 
that so many of us hang on to in order to avoid the suffering our particular existences 
bring.  We will lose family, friends, all relationships as they are (hopeful bridges between 
distinct and separated entities).  We will lose the experience of waking beside a loved 
one, of seeing a child’s happy smile, of the memories associated with long friendships.  
We will lose the material comforts and simple pleasures we sprinkle into our days, the 
stylish clothes, video games, sweet foods and beloved possessions.  We will lose the 
excitements and tensions of sexuality and physicality.  We will lose all abstract art after 
we give up our selves, all those incredible expressions of individual genius in cinema, 
literature, music, and the visual arts.  Self-consideration, interest in intellectual subjects, 
the type of writing which will belong to the new history, the inquiry I engage in here, all 
philosophical thought belonging to individuals, will also end.  Inasmuch as the charms of 
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life are human but also particular, they will cease to be.  It is natural to mourn their 
passing, as they are expressions of how we are now, often the greatest such expressions.  
They are indeed not to be given up lightly; without them, most of us would be mentally 
and emotionally bereft of positive experiences.  But all those charms of life are particular, 
and must be given up on our journey to universality.  Knowledge of their loss is 
important, but more so is our ability to let them go without resentment. 
 With regards to the issue of human influence on the world, there has been a 
universal history posited in recent years.  In 2009, Dipesh Chakrabarty, an historian of 
postcolonial studies, published an article in Critical Inquiry titled, “The Climate of 
History: Four Theses.”  In the article, Chakrabarty discusses the impact on history that 
global climate change is causing.  There is no longer as clear a difference between natural 
history and human history, since humanity is actively shaping the natural environment on 
a global scale.  As Chakrabarty notes, it has been proposed to refer to the current epoch 
of the Earth as the Anthropocene, in recognition of the massive impact humanity has had.  
But the Anthropocene is neither complimentary nor optimistic.  The name is given in 
light of the negative consequences of human activity, most notable among them climate 
change.  But interestingly enough, the Anthropocene also engenders a universal look at 
human history, at least in the context of the past, an effort mostly abandoned in the 
historical discipline.  In Chakrabarty’s conclusion, he contrasts the Anthropocene and its 
universality with the optimistic universality of Hegel: 
It is not a Hegelian universal arising dialectically out of the movement of history, 
or a universal of capital brought forth by the present crisis . . . Yet climate change 
poses for us a question of a human collectivity, an us, pointing to a figure of the 
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universal that escapes our capacity to experience the world.  It is more like a 
universal that arises from a shared sense of a catastrophe.  It calls for a global 
approach to politics without the myth of a global identity, for, unlike a Hegelian 
universal, it cannot subsume particularities.  We may provisionally call it a 
“negative universal history.”113 
A negative universal history is pessimistic, and must thus be subverted.  The new history 
would do the same to recognize the negative impacts of human activity on the world as a 
negative universal history, but looks to future action to create a better world.  The 
mythical global identity referred to in the article must be one we create.  In order to create 
a universal future, we must be willing to recognize the mistakes of our past (indeed, they 
are the motivating element of the new history) without giving in to the pessimism that 
may so easily be engendered with a negative universalism. 
 In the arts, there are few better counter-arguments to a universal humanity than 
the 1995-96 Japanese television show, Neon Genesis Evangelion.  On first sight a 
standard mecha anime in an apocalyptic future featuring young children fighting in giant 
robots against alien invaders known as Angels, the show demonstrates itself to be one of 
the most intense character dramas in television, filled with philosophical themes and 
motifs regarding the human condition.  Amid incredible religious imagery and motifs 
from Freudian psychology, the somewhat obscure plot explores what human existence is, 
and comes to a determination for what it should be.  The show is set in an apocalyptic 
future, in which giant aliens called Angels are invading our world with the intention of 
destroying humanity; the opposition is fronted by the organization NERV, and supported 
by the cabal SEELE.  The main character, Shinji, is a lonely teenage boy recruited as a 
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pilot for a biomechanical fighting robot, which are known as Evas.  As the show 
progresses and more characters are introduced, including Shinji’s father, Gendo, and 
Shinji’s fellow pilot and object of his sexual attraction, Asuka Langley-Sōryu, among 
others, the struggles of each character become more and more the focus of the story.  
Each character is driven by some internal misery, a form of suffering that they cannot 
overcome.  Shinji wants to feel the love of his father Gendo, who in turn was so broken 
by the death of his wife that he is incapable of giving Shinji the love a child deserves.  
Asuka found her mother’s body after she committed suicide, and blames both her mother 
for leaving her and herself for not being able to keep her mother at her side.  But as the 
show makes clear, the reason each person suffers is because they are all irreversibly 
lonely, completely isolated from each other.  Episode 4 is named “Hedgehog’s 
Dilemma,” a reference to the work of philosopher Arthur Schopenhauer.  The hedgehog’s 
dilemma, as described by Schopenhauer (although he used porcupines) refers to the 
human need to provide each other comfort.  As porcupines huddle together in winter to 
keep warm, they prick each other with their quills; after enough of this, they compromise 
by remaining a little apart.  In the same way, when separate humans seek to comfort each 
other in their mental and emotional distress, they cannot but hurt each other as their 
differences collide. 
 The only character who seems to be at peace is the mysterious Kaworu Nagisa, a 
boy who becomes a pilot late in the show after Asuka becomes catatonic after a mental 
attack from an Angel.  Kaworu immediately demonstrates his complete love for Shinji, 
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and expresses to Shinji his own understanding of the human condition.  In episode 24, 
Kaworu notes Shinji’s tendency towards social isolation:  
Kaworu: “You are afraid of any kind of initial contact, aren’t you?  Are you that 
afraid of other people?  I know that by keeping others at a distance, you avoid a 
betrayal of your trust.  But while you may not be hurt that way, you mustn’t forget 
that you must endure the loneliness.  Man can never erase this sadness because all 
men are fundamentally alone . . . You know, pain is something that man must 
endure in his heart, and since the heart feels pain so easily, some believe life is 
pain.  You are delicate, like glass; that is, your heart is. 
Shinji: It is? 
Kaworu: Yes, this is worth earning my empathy. 
Shinji: Empathy? 
Kaworu: I’m saying I love you.”114 
 
Kaworu urges Shinji to accept his own suffering and loneliness, to maintain what it 
means to be human in a static sense.  Later in the episode, Kaworu reveals himself to be 
the final Angel, but allows Shinji to kill him out of love for Shinji and the human race. 
 Despite the death of the final Angel, the show does not end.  The shadowy 
organization known as SEELE wish to create a forced evolution for humanity.  They and 
their agents wish to unite all of humanity into a single entity, the process for which all the 
fighting had taken place.  They refer to their goal as the Human Instrumentality Project; 
all humans would be united, leaving behind their individual bodies and identities and 
becoming a vast living sea known as the LCL Sea.  By uniting all of humanity, SEELE 
wishes to end our suffering as individuals, believing that if we were not separate, then we 
                                                          
114 Neon Genesis Evangelion, episode 24, “The Final Messenger,” directed by Hideaki Anno, aired March 
13, 1996, on TV Tokyo. 
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could not hurt each other.  The climax of the story is when Shinji is given the 
responsibility (through various plot mechanics) of choosing whether or not to force 
humanity’s evolution in this manner, or leave humanity as composed of individuals.  The 
final episode consists of Shinji’s internal dialogue, mulling over his own suffering, the 
suffering of others, and why humans suffer at all.  He eventually makes the decision that 
to evade suffering by forcing our evolution and abandoning our particularity is a 
demonstration of weakness, fear, and hatred, much like Heidegger.  And like Tolstoy, he 
resigns our species to everlasting particularity.  His reasoning, relying on the advice of 
Kaworu, is to justify suffering itself.  Suffering may exist, but so too does love, of others 
and the self.  Shinji says, “Maybe I could love myself.  Maybe my life could have a 
greater value.  That’s right!  I am no more or less than myself!  I am me!  I want to be 
myself!  I want to continue existing in this world!  My life is worth living here!”115  
While Shinji’s path to self-acceptance and love is moving, the show nevertheless affirms 
not only the particular, but specifically self-interest.  Shinji makes the decision to keep 
humanity separate out of his own desires.  Even SEELE engaged in the evolution toward 
humanity by force, without the consent and communal self-sacrifice of all humans.  The 
show ends with Shinji surrounded by all the other individuals he knows inside his own 
mind, congratulating him on his journey to self-love.  The music rises with hope and 
positivity, and the sky inside Shinji’s imagination is clear and bright.  The suffering that 
Shinji and Kaworu justify is nowhere to be seen. 
                                                          
115 Neon Genesis Evangelion, episode 26, “The Beast That Shouted Love at the Heart of the World,” 
directed by Hideaki Anno, aired March 27, 1996, on TV Tokyo. 
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 Many watchers were disappointed in the simplicity of the show’s ending, and 
after a year the creators reimagined the ending as it took place in the world outside 
Shinji’s mind in the movie End of Evangelion.  As that movie ends, Shinji appears on the 
shore of the red LCL Sea under a night sky, having made his decision to remain an 
individual.  Asuka is the first individual to leave the Sea, and lies next to him.  Without 
dialogue or music, only the LCL Sea breaking on the beach behind them, while both 
characters stare wide-eyed, Shinji rolls over and begins to throttle Asuka.  His breathing 
is shuddery, and his hands shake with effort.  As he chokes her, she reaches up and gently 
caresses his face.  He ceases throttling her, and begins to sob.  The movie ends with 
Asuka, without inflection, saying, “How disgusting.”116  No motivation for either 
Asuka’s or Shinji’s actions is given, but the scene serves as a microcosm for humanity as 
depicted in the story.  Suffering, accompanied by love and forgiveness, will remain.  The 
last scene of End of Evangelion better demonstrates the truth the story wants to impart to 
us than the last scene of Neon Genesis Evangelion.  It provides a more honest and explicit 
depiction of what the story argues humanity should be; lonely, isolated, unexcused from 
suffering, but loved. 
 But for all that love is held up as the answer to humanity’s problems, the story has 
a weak argument.  It addresses the problem of suffering that is caused by other humans, 
often referred to as moral suffering, quite well.  Love is indeed the best answer for 
individual beings.  But what kind of love is it that Hideaki Anno’s story advocates, but 
                                                          
116 Hideaki Anno, End of Evangelion, directed by Hideaki Anno (1997; Tokyo: Gainax, Production 
I.G/ING, 1998), Film. 
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the love of individuals?  The story may very well satisfy us that through love and 
forgiveness, we can work through life by coming to peace with moral suffering, but the 
love between individuals will not help us overcome suffering, or bring us to a 
universality.  More deeply extant than the suffering of individual humans in relation to 
each other, as is posed in Evangelion, is the suffering of that which is finite, of that which 
is faced with the end of possibilities.  Tolstoy understands the suffering of the finite, and 
in like fashion to Anno can only see that love is the solution for enduring human 
existence.  Tolstoy’s broader sense of human suffering exists not only because of our 
individual beings; it exists because of self-awareness of particularity and death, which is 
the suffering that Heidegger wishes us to embrace as inevitable.  Hideaki Anno’s story 
fails to address the validity of this suffering in adequate fashion, but still attempts to 
negate the possibility of a universal humanity.  Tolstoy wished for love as well, for peace 
and submission to natural law.  But love in that form, love that is mere submission to 
what is, will not avail humanity from its suffering.  The love that is needed to bring a 
universal humanity must be active and completely self-sacrificial; it must be love that is 
universal, all-encompassing, and transformative.  Without such love at the core of the 
new history, we will fall to self-interest. 
It may be noted that attaining a universal state of existence as described here is far 
beyond the type of universality defined by the likes of Hegel and Marx.  It is admittedly 
in the realm of science fiction and religion in terms of present feasibility.  But new 
historians look to the future; we seek action, influence, agency, and above all else 
enshrine the human ability to declare and create its own truth, its own existence.  And 
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even aside from the general spirit of the argumentation heretofore presented, to unite 
humanity with the universe itself and attain complete mastery over it is the logical end of 
seeking the universal.  While such a goal seems far-fetched at best, and laughable at 
worst, especially to we historians, whose tools to assist in reaching the universal will 
become useless as soon as individuals cease to exist, the efforts of science and 
technological development have already gained our species incredible developments.  
Our knowledge of physics has come so far in the last century and a half as to make 
physics in the nineteenth-century seem laughable.  We have accomplished much to 
research the underlying structures of the laws of the universe.  Though they still confound 
us, especially in the realm of quantum physics, we learn more and more, and are 
discovering how to control and manipulate reality in ever-more complex ways.  
Simulations of our own sentience and intelligence in the form of A.I. are becoming more 
and more similar to ourselves.  In the near future, thanks to the medical sciences, 
robotics, computing, and artificial intelligence, we may very likely see the unification of 
human and computer, or human and machine.  Genetic engineering is another avenue by 
which we may change the way we exist in the universe in the very near future, one which 
holds both promise and foreboding, as with all such avenues.  From the most far-fetched 
to the already-on-our-doorstep, possibilities for changes to our being exist for us to 
choose or not.  There are many, especially in the wake of industrialization, global 
capitalism, and massive climate change, who fear the potential humanity wields to shape 
the universe.  There are some who would even halt our ability to progress, who would see 
the end of technological developments that would change our being in order to prevent 
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the destruction to the universe they see as inevitable.  In some ways it is hard to blame 
those who only fear, those who are pessimistic about what humanity may do given the 
opportunity.  Thousands of species have gone extinct or been significantly diminished 
because of human efforts and carelessness.  Pessimism, combined with a submission to 
the natural laws which govern us, is the Tolstoyan message in War and Peace.  But, of 
course, the only reason there can be so much fear is because there is so much potential for 
change in the human.  And change is only what we make it, what we choose it to be 
through our own actions and the actions of those who follow us.  Where there are huge, 
universe-changing potentialities for humanity to make mistakes and commit 
unforgiveable errors, there are equally universe-changing potentialities for humanity to 
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